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ABSTRACT

Problems of providing effective training for moral development are discussed. Intended for teachers, parents, and education students, the book lends itself easily to application in the classroom. The book is presented in three sections. Section I provides a historical and philosophical perspective on the need for moral education and on basic questions concerning human nature. Topics discussed include the legacy of John Dewey, approaches to moral education, philosophical assumptions and comparative approaches to moral development, such as the psychoanalytical, behavioral, humanistic, and developmental schools of thought. Section II describes four contemporary approaches to moral education: (1) the cognitive-developmental approach of Lawrence Kohlberg; (2) individual psychology as developed by Alfred Adler and Rudolf Dreikurs; (3) the organismic approach of Carl Rogers; and (4) the behavioral approach, which stresses modeling and reinforcement of moral behavior. Implications for classroom education, training for teachers and parents, and community activities associated with each approach are specified. Section III discusses the practical application of values clarification in the classroom. Suggestions for further reading are included. (Author/DB)

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Guidance in moral development must relate to the present and look to the future.



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(Continued on inside back cover.)

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To
Deborah and Mark

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Preface

More children today are confronted by more choices than possibly at any other time in human history. Sorting out the desirable from the undesirable alternatives can be a bewildering task. Furthermore, it is not even possible for most children today to think in terms of limiting the choices they must face to the small geographical confines of home, neighborhood, or classroom. Modern travel and especially the mass media have opened up the whole world to virtually every child. Children today are much less provincial and much more sophisticated, yet also potentially more perplexed. Admittedly, some (from my own classroom experience) often shrink back into a kind of provincialism just in order to avoid dealing with their own perplexity. Adults do this also. Witness the current fad of nostalgia. But this is never for long, since such a retreat cannot possibly be effective in coping with the world as it is. The future, indeed, the present will not wait.

If you think that this difference between the choices facing the school children of today and yesterday has been exaggerated, just consider for a moment the areas of conflict with which nearly all of today's teenagers are either directly or indirectly involved: *religion* (atheism or reformism or fundamentalism or Zen?), *politics* (national security or individual liberty? governmental intervention or free enterprise? rule of law or rule of personality and personal authority or of vested interest?), *family* (extended or nuclear or communal? monogomous or polygamous? children or childless? one parent or two or three?), *drugs* (hard or soft? alcohol or tobacco or prescriptions?), *success* (popularity or nonconformism? materialism or self-satisfaction?), *sex* (chastity or premarital? for fun or for commitment? straight or gay or bisexual?), *sex role behavior* (liberation or tradition? masculine or feminine or both?), *race* (interracial dating or separate but equal? equality of opportunity or inequality of opportunity in order to achieve equality of opportunity?). Not even concerns as old as health and aging and death have remained the same. Our technology has apparently been poisoning our bodies. We send our elderly away to die while we try to dismiss the reality of death by making it both illusionary and commonplace on the movie and TV screens. No, the world is not the same as it was, perhaps, even just a decade or two ago.

It is, of course, not new that our children ask questions about themselves, their families, their communities, their world, and their future in that world. It is the complexity of the world, not the phenomena of asking which is new. It is also not new that children ask questions of their elders. Questions are addressed to

parents, to teachers, and to religious leaders; they are also now, of course, addressed to a variety of media stars—from show business, to the sports arena, to the political arena. But let us assume that the former group, the traditional sources, are still the most sought-after by our young people. The question then becomes: are these adults prepared to deal effectively with the complex questions that will be asked and the multi-faceted issues that will be raised by young people confronting the modern world? This question is here particularly aimed at teachers and all others concerned with those institutions which provide for the formal training of our youth.

All of the issues above, and so many others, involve the person who is trying to make a choice in what may be called the *valuing process.* That is, a choice is required which is an expression of personal values or morals. At a time when the past, present, and future all had close resemblance to one another, teachers, parents, and religious leaders could usually be relatively effective, or at least seemingly so, in the process of teaching morals by simply transmitting their own morals to the young. Those days are gone. Some other process or program of instruction must be implemented if moral education is to be effective.

The following chapters in this book are all concerned with the problems of providing effective training for moral development. Part I provides a historical and philosophical perspective on the need for moral education and on very basic, yet relevant, questions concerning human nature itself. Part II presents four contemporary approaches to moral education as well as the corresponding theories of moral development which underlie those approaches. Part III presents one specific and rather practical approach to moral education. It is particularly attractive to many educators because it lends itself so easily to application in the classroom.

A knowledge of how children learn morals, of how the valuing process actually occurs will enable us to act responsibly in our task as educators. The word *responsible* has been defined as the ability to respond. It is this ability that we will need in order to act as the guides of our children into a future which is theirs.

PART I

HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES

CHAPTER 1

The Legacy of John Dewey

John Dewey's *Moral Principles in Education* was first published in 1909. This was neither his first nor last work on the subject. It was, however, perhaps his clearest and most precise. The book was clearly aimed at classroom teachers, educators in general, and all others concerned with the education of youth. The book stands today as a classic on the controversial subject of society's capacity and responsibility to provide an education in morality. With his well thought-out views on the subject and his explicit stand in favor of a vigorous and deliberate approach to a program of moral education, Dewey left to succeeding generations of teachers and parents a legacy that has, until just recently, remained unfulfilled.

ATTACKING THE MISCONCEPTIONS

Dewey attacked what perhaps can be considered the two most widely held assumptions, or rather misconceptions, about moral education: (1) that morality can be taught as a separate subject matter in the school curriculum—through didactic instruction which has as its aim the inculcation of accepted standards of moral behavior and (2) that it is sufficient to allow the "hidden curriculum" to remain hidden, that is, that sufficient moral instruction will just naturally occur as teachers go about the processes of maintaining good order in their classrooms.

Dewey commenced his attack on the first of these misconceptions by distinguishing between moral ideas, which have become a genuine part of moral character, and thereby a part of the working motives of behavior, and ideas about moral action. The latter will most probably remain as ineffective as any other particular "fact" or piece of information which students are required to simply memorize. Research into the effectiveness of didactic religious and moral training later proved Dewey to be correct on this point. And today the widely utilized taxonomy of educational objectives by Bloom has confirmed it. According to Bloom, teaching which aims toward the memorization of factual material is less significant and is also for the most part ineffectual.[1]

In regard to the second misconception Dewey maintained that in principle teachers are right to regard themselves as teaching morals as they go about the task of requiring a stable social order in their classrooms. But the manner in which this is most often carried on is not such in purpose or detail so as to bring identifiable intellectual results into vital union with that moral character which expresses itself in behavior. In fact, the results of such teaching may be quite

counter-productive. Students may simply accept for themselves labels of being good or bad and thus behave according to what they perceive is expected of them.

In attacking both of these misconceptions, Dewey defined the business of the educator as being the task of insuring that the ideas acquired by children and youth are so acquired that they become "moving" ideas, motive forces in the guidance of behavior. It is in this way and in this way only that rather commonplace statements about the ultimate purpose of all education being the formation of character or citizenship have any genuine meaning. Dewey's book, in fact, was a demand that educators—whether parents or teachers—actually and effectively do what so many already said that they were doing—making moral education universal and dominant in all classroom or home instruction.

In understanding the legacy that this giant among American educators has left for us to accomplish, there must be no confusion as to his meaning in making moral education the primary goal of instruction. He did not intend that teachers maintain direct moral considerations uppermost in their minds. Such an endeavor would only serve to realize the aforementioned misconceptions concerning moral education. Rather, Dewey's intent was to make the processes of learning the subject matter, of acquiring cognitive, social, and affective power and skills such that the students' very behavior will reflect these processes. In this way the students' moral decisions will be enlightened and consistent. Progressively the student will become the best evaluator of his own moral behavior.

PROCLAIMING THE ESSENTIAL

Dewey laid the foundations for a theory of moral education by first attacking the popular misconceptions and then by proclaiming the essential ground of all moral training—the social scene of action. According to Dewey, what the student requires is not direct moral instruction, such as admonitions to be honest and truthful, but rather the formation of habits of social imagination and conception. To this end all the resources of the school must be utilized. These are (1) the school itself, viewed as a learning community, (2) the prevalent methods of learning and doing work, and (3) the curriculum of study. In all these areas the development of the social intelligence, the social power, and the social interests of the child or youth is seen as the primary or universal purpose, the very reason for the schools' existence.

Perhaps this is all better understood by reference to an example. Mathematics is considered by most persons, teachers and parents alike, to be simply a study of technical relations and formulas. But Dewey considered it to be a radical mistake to treat the study of numbers as an end in itself. He wrote, "The prevailing divorce between information and character, between knowledge and social action, stalks upon the scene here."[2] Instead, mathematics should be taught as the means of accomplishing some end, inevitably a social end. Thus, as the student learns mathematics he is more motivated because his efforts are goal

oriented, implicitly socially oriented. His learning to manipulate numbers becomes an exercise with a social and thereby moral end.

In this view then, moral motives and forces are nothing more or less than social intelligence and social power. And these phenomena, according to Dewey, are essentially the power of observing and comprehending social situations coupled with the capacity of control and action in the service of social interests and goals. It is the proper function of educators to facilitate the child's development of this power and this capacity. Dewey wrote,

> In so far as the school represents in its own spirit, a genuine community life; in so far as what are called school discipline, government, order, etc., are the expressions of this inherent social spirit; in so far as the methods used are those that appeal to the active and constructive powers, permitting the child to give out and thus to serve; in so far as the curriculum is so selected and organized as to provide the material for affording the child a consciousness of the world in which he has to play a part, and the demands he has to meet; so far as these ends are met, the school is organized on an ethical basis. So far as general principles are concerned, all the basic ethical requirements are met. The rest remains between the individual teacher and the individual child.[3]

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE IN MORAL EDUCATION

Considering moral behavior as a mode of individual action, that is, as a personal response in an interpersonal setting, leads to the necessity of considering the psychological implications of moral education in addition to the social implications. In his recognition that all behavior has its origins in what he termed internal instincts and impulses, Dewey was one of the first to point out the necessity of our understanding exactly what these are at each particular stage of a child's development. Only with such knowledge can the teacher know to what he should appeal in the child of a particular age. Dewey wrote,

> The subject-matter of the curriculum, however important, however judiciously selected, is empty of conclusive moral content until it is made over into terms of the individual's own activities, habits, and desires. We must know what history, geography, and mathematics mean in psychological terms, that is, as modes of personal experiencing, before we can get out of them their moral potentialities.[4]

Dewey did not have the contemporary store of psychological knowledge available to him—that knowledge which underlies the contemporary approaches to moral education discussed in Part II. Remarkably, however, in his outline of what he considered to be the significant requirements of a psychology of moral development and behavior, he prefigured the essential ingredients in these later approaches. He referred to these requirements as the "necessary constituents of character."[5] At this point it might be conjectured that the reason for Dewey's legacy having to wait so long for recognition and eventual fulfillment lies precisely in this lack of psychological information.

The first of Dewey's necessary constituents is "force of character."[6] This refers to the individual's capacity or power to stand up and be counted in the actual conflicts of life. He saw this capacity as being characterized by such qualities as initiative, resistance, persistence, courage, and industry. Appropriate to the child's age, Dewey defined the task of education as being one that provides the conditions for optimal development of this otherwise innate or natural capacity.

But this force of character must be directed toward, and organized along, social interests. Alone it may become brutal, seeking the fulfillment of its own ends by any possible means. This involves education for the development of both the intellectual or cognitive capacities as well as for the emotional or affective capacities.

In regard to intellectual capacities, Dewey called for the teacher to be concerned with facilitating the development of moral judgment. He defined judgment as knowledge directed to the accomplishment of goals and purposes. Mere knowledge of fact or information is simply held in store, not used. Such knowledge may be considered ethically dead because it has its center or locus of existence without, not within, the individual. It becomes ethically alive only when the individual evaluates it for himself by experimenting with it, so to speak, and trying it on for size. The classroom and curriculum should be so organized as to allow for the maximum opportunity for such individual endeavors. These must be experienced by the student as being personally relevant. With such opportunity the child will develop his capacity for moral judgment. He will be able to grasp the whole situation with which he is confronted, distinguish the relevant aspects which demand his response, and finally evaluate his action in the light of the effects he, as an individual, has had upon the original situation.

The third constituent of moral character in Dewey's scheme was much harder for him to define. Again, in Part II it will be greatly amplified. In order for individual judgment to be socially effective it must be augmented by a rather delicate capacity for personal responsiveness, that is, a capacity for emotional reaction.[7] The educator's task of providing the proper environment for the development of such capacity is here no less significant or less difficult. According to Dewey, unless the individual possesses an intuitive sensitiveness to the social ramifications of any particular situation, to the social ends and interests of others, the intellectual components of judgment will not have proper material to work upon. In this respect, Dewey wrote, "Just as the material of knowledge is supplied through the senses, so the material of ethical knowledge is supplied by emotional responsiveness."[8]

SETTING THE STANDARDS

In conclusion, Dewey has provided us with certain standards by which we can judge the work of the school in terms of what it accomplishes for the individual development of a capacity for moral judgment. These same standards may be used

in judging those contemporary approaches to moral education which are the subject of Parts II and III of this book. In setting these standards, Dewey asked the following questions:

1. Does the school as a system, at present, attach sufficient importance to the spontaneous instincts and impulses?
2. Does it afford sufficient opportunity for these to assert themselves and work out their own results?
3. Can we even say that the school in principle attaches itself, at present, to the active constructive powers rather than to processes of absorption and learning?
4. Does not our talk about self-activity largely render itself meaningless because the self-activity we have in mind is purely "intellectual," out of relation to those impulses which work through hand and eye?[8]

If either past or present approaches to the facilitation of moral development fail to meet the test of Dewey's questions, the moral capacity of our future citizens, and thereby our society, will continue to be in doubt. Educators, according to Dewey, must scrutinize their activities in the light of such questions, but must also never lose faith in the existence of moral principles which are capable of effective application. These principles need to be formulated in social and psychological terms and grounded in the school experience of individual children. Moral principles are real. They are an inseparable part of community life and in the working, moving, changing structure of the individual in the community.

CHAPTER 2

Earlier Approaches to Moral Education

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

American educators have before, and especially since Dewey, continued to be concerned with the problem of providing moral or character education. Moral education refers to that process by which the capacity of an individual to make and/or act on decisions deemed moral is facilitated by others. In pre-World War II years this concern of educators was manifested in both direct and indirect ways. The now infamous "McGuffian" readers sought to instill moral virtue through the content of the stories read by young students. Moral education was often cited as being the primary justification for the social studies curriculum and school athletics. Character-education classes, on the other hand, and especially religious instruction, took a more direct approach. Both of these attempts were deliberately designed, founded on the belief that there exists an identifiable cluster of character traits or virtues that can be taught to children and youth. Any particular list would have included such things as honesty, courage, service, temperance, purity, and loyalty.

In the postwar years, however, the trend has been quite different. It would appear that educators have remained concerned but also somewhat frustrated. For instance, certain research findings have indicated that character-education classes and religious instruction have little influence on moral conduct.[1] Perhaps even more significant, the general impetus toward ethical relativism may be viewed as directly responsible for retarding continued and conscious efforts at teaching from the old "bag of virtues." The task of consensus building, necessary for the implementation of any such program of moral education, has accordingly been made quite difficult.

THE HIDDEN CURRICULUM

Yet this is not to say that education in morality has not been continuing. It has, whether recognized as such or not. Many observers, especially of late, have continued to point out that neither classroom teaching nor, for instance, typical school counseling relationships, occur as purely objective, value-neutral activities.[2] Silberman has, in fact, identified such values as those listed above as having most often remained the unrecognized mainstays of teacher-student interaction.[3] This could even be viewed as a backward move from the deliberateness of

McGuffy. Silberman warns that the result of such interaction is not the building of courageous, service-oriented individuals, but rather the production of a social mass made up of conforming individuals.

As stated earlier, a viable program of moral education remains a preoccupation of many educators. Simon has suggested that rather than naively allowing educational processes to continue without stated reference to particular value components, such components be identified and be either made part of those objectives otherwise agreed upon or others substituted in their place.[4] Thus, the central questions of moral education remain: what values should or should not be taught and how they are learned so that they become a part of effective social behavior. Parts II and III of this book look at contemporary answers to these questions. First, however, a short look at three earlier approaches to the teaching of morality is necessary in order to put contemporary developments in perspective.

"BAG OF VIRTUES" APPROACH

This approach became very popular in the 1920s, although it was not, of course, referred to as such by its proponents. This derisive name was given later. It was a definition of character education which viewed the task as primarily one of teaching a set of personal traits generally considered to be positive—a list of virtues on which everyone could agree. The attraction of this approach to educators was immense. People might not always agree on the specific details of right and wrong, but it was thought that all would agree that such traits as honesty and responsibility are good things.

The "bag of virtues" approach assumed that in any given community there exists a cultural consensus on what personal traits are virtuous and that the teaching of them in the schools is both legitimate as well as a fundamental responsibility of the educator. But this approach had its downfall for obvious reasons. Since ours is a pluralistic society, community school officials and individual members of the public eventually began to experience much difficulty in obtaining agreement on just which virtues should be put in the virtue bag.

This kind of debate has itself an old history going back to classical times. Aristotle had a bag of virtues which included such items as pride, temper, liberality, temperance, truthfulness, and justice. Today, such a list as that promoted by the Boy Scouts is, perhaps, better known—loyalty, reverence, cleanliness, preparedness, and bravery. Apparently, everyone may have his own bag, as many have had in the past—from the Code of Hammurabi in ancient Babylon to the code of conduct regulating affairs at King Arthur's Round Table in "Old England."

But the problem with this approach actually was and remains more complicated than simple disagreement over the compilation of the list of virtues to be taught. The teaching of particular virtues such as truthfulness or honesty may at first arouse little controversy. However, any such apparent consensus has and will

probably dissolve in the face of disagreement over the definitions of these qualities: what is one person's commitment to honest self-expression may be another person's insensitivity to others. In the 1960s students were lauded as being idealistic and courageous by some and condemned as being irresponsible and immature by others.

The "bag of virtues" approach apparently has had and continues to have inherent problems; community consensus on what constitutes proper behavior is not always possible or even probable in modern society. Even if a majority consensus is possible in a given community on rather vague character traits, as soon as the connection of such traits, through their use as evaluative criteria by school personnel, is made to specific actions by specific persons the consensus invariably falls apart. The problem for the educator is, thereby, raised again—what approach to utilize in a program of moral education.

RESPECT-FOR-AUTHORITY APPROACH

The Respect-for-Authority Approach has defined moral education in terms of respect for established authority, rules, and current community values. According to its adherents, educators should accept and teach and provide models for whatever values are currently held by the community as specified by the community's legal representatives (i.e., boards of education: local, state, and national). The following rules established in 1915 for female teachers reflects, no doubt, a local board's more general concern for the moral development of the community's children:

1. You are not to keep company with men.
2. You must be home between the hours of 8 P.M. and 6 A.M., unless attending a school function.
3. You may not loiter downtown in ice cream stores.
4. You may not travel beyond the city limits, unless you have permission of the chairman of the board.
5. You may not ride in a carriage or automobile with any man, unless he is your father or brother.
6. You may not smoke cigarettes.
7. You may not dress in bright colors.
8. You may under no circumstances dye your hair.
9. You must wear at least two petticoats.
10. Your dresses must not be any shorter than two inches above the ankle.
11. To keep the school room neat and clean, you must: sweep the floor at least once daily; scrub the floor at least once a week with hot soapy water; clean the blackboards at least once a day; and start the fire at 7 A.M. so the room will be warm by 8 A.M.

This approach in a sense "begs the question." School boards have still been left with the problem of filling their bag with particular virtues for which they believe

a consensus exists. School board elections, of course, tend to confirm or refute board decisions accordingly.

But this approach, nevertheless, has still been singularly definable. It rests on the assumption that teaching the child respect for the school's authority will eventually lead the adult to respect society and established legal authority. It differs from the "bag of virtues" approach in that it does not assume the existence of any universal moral principles or values. Rather, it equates morality with group values. Each individual member of the group acquires his values from the group. The task of educators is such that they should accept and teach whatever values established authority deems proper.

This approach, especially since the Second World War, has come under much criticism. Fewer persons today would argue that obedience for established legal authority is the ultimate moral value. For most persons the barbarities of twentieth-century totalitarian regimes, such as those which occurred in Nazi Germany, have become grim reminders of the fact that adjustment to group norms, regardless of their legalization, does not lead to nor comprise moral maturity.

SOCIAL-ADJUSTMENT APPROACH

The Social-Adjustment Approach has sought to completely avoid the use of moral terms and to focus instead on the "mental health" of students as a basis for determining what constitutes proper behavior. This approach became increasingly popular with educators up until just the last decade or so. Its advocates have pointed to the fact that problems posed by questions of ethical relativity may be ignored altogether. All that need concern educators is the development of students as well-adjusted members of society. Misbehavior or socially maladjusted behavior is interpreted as requiring the intervention of appropriate mental health professionals—counselors, social workers, and school psychologists.

Recently, however, this approach has been increasingly questioned by educators and psychologists. It has been noted that it becomes seemingly inadequate to deal with moral or value issues under the cover of mental health labels, for these labels themselves are not necessarily scientific and value-free. At the very least, it has been observed that such labels may lend themselves to abusive purposes, often being used to make prejudicial judgments about individual behavior.

And again it is apparent that in a pluralistic society, one composed of various racial and ethnic groupings, what may be considered immoral or maladjusted behavior in a public setting such as a school may well be viewed as healthy, even socially commendable, in a given neighborhood or family. The problem here is quite similar to the problem educators have experienced with the use of IQ tests. It has been demonstrated that inner city students who have scored low on conventional tests of intelligence have actually increased their scores on those

tests which have used language and situations taken from their own environmental backgrounds.

SUMMARY

The reader, no doubt, recognizes the rather enormous problems facing educators and other persons concerned with providing a program of moral or character education in our public schools. On the one hand, the building of a community consensus on what values are to be taught is not only improbable but apparently not even desirable. Surely we do not want to produce a social mass of conforming individuals. And it appears rather unjust, and therefore seemingly "immoral," to insist that those who behave in nonconforming ways are necessarily unhealthy. We have even been warned of the dangers of this approach by such prophetic novels as *1984* by George Orwell and *Brave New World* by Aldous Huxley.

Yet the challenge for educators as contained in the legacy from Dewey remains and cannot be long ignored. It has been pointed out that education in morality has been continuing, whether recognized as such or not. This reality may itself be considered by quite reasonable persons to be immoral. For instance, public institutions may have the right to require certain modes of conduct simply in order to get the work at hand accomplished more efficiently. This is a matter of expediency. But it becomes quite another matter when expediency is equated with morality. This is, of course, what happens when adherence to particular codes of conduct is couched in moral terms—such as when a child is told it is wrong or bad not to keep his desk clean. It could even be argued that such an approach is itself unhealthy (and thereby immoral to those who rely on the social adjustment or mental health approach to moral education), since it tends to instill a sense of guilt and self-deprecation.

Thus, what are educators to do? In the following chapters we shall look at recent attempts by psychologists and educators to solve some of these dilemmas which have become so apparent. The ethical, scientific, and practical problems involved in providing moral instruction are not necessarily insurmountable, but they do require that great care be taken in deciding what is to be taught and how it is to be taught. Certainly, it is apparent that the issues involved in moral education, and, one might say, the moral issues involved in classroom education, cannot be ignored by either teachers, administrators, or those members of the public concerned with the education of children.

CHAPTER 3

Philosophical Assumptions and Comparative Approaches to Moral Development

THE KEY QUESTIONS

Underlying the various approaches to moral development are different answers to key questions about the nature of man: is man good or evil? is man rational or irrational? is man purely concerned with seeking his own pleasure? what is man's relation to the society in which he lives? Through the ages philosophers and psychologists have answered these questions differently, and from their assumptions about the nature of man have developed varying approaches to moral development and to moral education.

For example, if man is evil, one must be concerned about the external or internal restraints which must be developed in order to control man's destructive impulses. On the other hand, if man is basically good, a supportive setting may be provided in which he learns to create his own approach to life and his own ethical system. If man is rational, one develops a system which appeals to his reason. On the other hand, if man is basically irrational, then one must give more careful consideration to the emotional origins of behavior. Moreover, if man is seen basically in conflict with society, and society is deemed good and trustworthy, the society must devise methods to bring recalcitrant man into line with cultural expectations. On the other hand, if the ultimate evolution of man is harmonious with the development of society there is little need for such restrictions.

Therefore, in order to understand differing theories of moral growth, and in order, moreover, to choose wisely among them for educational purposes, one must come to grips with the philosophical questions underlying the varying approaches to problems of man's ethical and moral behavior. Otherwise, the student of moral development and education will choose randomly those techniques and particular examples which appear to work best in any given situation. Such random selection produces a hodgepodge of responses lacking in consistent application. If there is one thing upon which all schools of moral development agree, it is that behavior in developing moral principles need be consistent. Therefore, take a moment to consider how you respond to the basic questions listed above: is man evil? good? does he seek pleasure, self-sacrifice, or even justice? should man be adjusted to his own society or should he formulate his principles regardless of society?

Each of the following schools of psychological thought, briefly considered, has a slightly different answer to each of these questions.

PSYCHOANALYSIS

One of the dominant trends in American psychology for the last 50 years has been the psychoanalytic school founded upon the thinking of Sigmund Freud. Freud did not have a very exalted view of man. He postulated that man was basically driven by instinctual urges, located in the unconscious id, to seek pleasure and avoid pain. This, Freud reasoned, would naturally lead men to come into conflict with others also seeking their own pleasure. Thus the basic nature of man would lead to conflict among men and between men and the established societal framework. From this conclusion, Freud saw that man needed to develop restraints which would allow him to control his pleasure-seeking drives so that he could live in harmony with society.

Moreover, unlike later theorists, Freud did not consider whether society was good or bad. Freud simply assumed that if men were to live with others, they must learn to conform to whatever were the prevailing norms in the society in which they lived. Therefore, he concentrated in his therapeutic practice on adjusting his patient to the reality of social norms and conventions. He was not necessarily concerned that man would thus be happy or contented but only recognized that this was the only solution to the conflict between pleasure-seeking man and the world in which he lived.

Development of Internal Restraints

Freud saw that the need for restraints could best be fulfilled by developing such restraints internally. He saw man motivated by three internal constructs: the id, the ego, and the superego. The id, as mentioned previously, is the repository of all instinctual drives and repressed feelings and thoughts which during his lifetime the individual did not wish to acknowledge. The id is primarily unconscious and is the motivating force in man. The ego is what Freud termed the "executor" of the personality. The ego, which develops after infancy, is the rational power of man which can evaluate information, weigh the pros and cons, and make decisions. The ego is primarily conscious and acts as a counter-force to the id; it considers which of the unconscious impulses should be fulfilled and which should not. Nonetheless, the ego is not strong enough to do this on its own. Thus, Freud postulated a third construct, the superego, which reinforces the ego in standing against the instinctual desires of the id. The superego, partially conscious and partially unconscious, is the internalized representative of all the cultural norms and expectations transmitted to the child through his parents. The superego,

molded by society, tells us what we should do and what we shouldn't do. In the superego we have within ourselves a rather stern taskmaster which guides us along the paths supposedly most fitted for men living in a given society.

Role of the Superego

For Freud, therefore, moral development is concerned primarily with the development of the superego, popularly called conscience, which tells us what is right and wrong, which approves good behavior and produces guilt for bad behavior—all according to the prevailing norms of society. Although the development of the superego continues throughout life, the greatest and most critical period of development begins around five to six years of age and continues throughout what Freud termed the latency period, up to twelve years of age. During this period of a child's life the development of the superego is most strongly influenced by the actions, words, and attitudes of immediate authority figures, the parents, the peer group, the school community. However, the actions of the parents in the home are seen by Freud as being the most crucial and as having the greatest effect in developing moral character.

The parents assist the development of the superego by consistently emphasizing what they consider to be right and wrong as they guide the child's behavior. Eventually the child internalizes these messages from the parents and makes them his own. For example, if the parents always speak truthfully to the child, and admonish him to be honest, the child will internalize in his superego this standard for himself. This internal standard will then reward him by allowing him to feel good when he is honest and punish him by causing him to feel bad when he is not so honest.

Accordingly, difficulty might arise in the development of a child's superego, if parental actions do not match parental behavior, that is, if parents are inconsistent. Examples of such inconsistency are (1) a mother tells her daughter to be "a little lady"; yet she supplies her with a Barbie doll for her birthday, complete with very sexy underwear and mini-skirts or (2) a father says very sternly that his son should respect and obey him, yet he complains of his son's timid behavior whenever asking a favor or treat from his father. Such children will have difficulty in learning to guide their behavior according to their own internalized standards, standards which are adopted primarily from their parents.

Importance of Guilt

The bad feeling which results when a person violates an internal standard is called guilt. Guilt is necessary in order to prevent one from doing wrong. Thus parents and teachers are encouraged by this approach in disciplinary measures which produce guilt for wrongdoing within children. The primary disciplinary procedure advocated is the withdrawal of love and approval. Since man seeks pleasure—and love and approval bring such pleasure—man will adjust his behav-

ior to win such approval. If, in wrongdoing, he loses love, he will be unhappy and choose to modify his actions in the next similar situation.

Moreover, the withdrawal of love has another advantage over other disciplinary procedures. The withdrawal of love from a child is not a quick and tangible punishment. The administration of a quick and tangible punishment such as a spanking obviates the need to develop guilt feelings. For in response to a wrong action, a quick, tangible punishment rights the balance; one has been paid for with the other. There is then no need to feel badly or to punish oneself through guilt. The punishment has been external. The withdrawal of love, on the other hand, does not provide any measurable response to a wrongdoing. Nonetheless, it generally leaves the child unhappy and without atonement. He atones, therefore, for his wrongdoing by self-punitive measures, by critical evaluation of himself, all of which are components of guilt.

Lack of Educational Implications

The basis of Freud's view of moral development rests then on the development of a superego which contains internalized standards of right and wrong. Such standards are enforced by the superego by causing the child to feel guilty when he betrays these standards. Moreover, there is no suggestion that these standards are any other than those prevalent in parental and societal thinking. Thus, the young person, with his recalcitrant id, is brought into line with societal norms by his internalized representative of society, his superego. Freud, moreover, views the conflict between the id and superego as being unresolvable. Thus man in this view is always the victim-spectator of his own internal forces.

Some of Freud's views agree with those of other theorists considered later. His emphasis, however, on moral development as essentially occurring in the very young child, with the parents as the primary instruments of this development, makes his theory a very impractical one for the educational setting. Therefore, although his theory has been discussed here as a vital part of psychological moral thought, it will not be further expanded in terms of educational implications.

BEHAVIORISM

A second dominant trend in American psychological thought has grown from the early work of John B. Watson and is known as behaviorism. Current leading proponents are Albert Bandura and B. F. Skinner. In behavioristic theory there are many similarities to the thinking of the psychoanalysts: (1) neither school of thought has a very exalted view of man; (2) both see man as shaped by forces which are outside his control; (3) both see man primarily as a pleasure-seeking animal, acting to avoid pain and to gain pleasure or reward; (4) neither school of thought questions the validity of societal norms, rather they both simply assume that such norms do and should shape the lives of its citizens.

Yet there are significant differences between the two schools of thought. Psychoanalysts are concerned primarily with internal forces which cause man to be in conflict with himself and also in conflict with the society in which he lives. Behaviorists, on the other hand, give no credence to such internal forces and in fact either deny their existence or simply consider them to be beyond the pale of objective observation and therefore irrelevant to science. Behaviorists see man as subject to forces in the external environment. Man's character, his needs, his values, indeed his morals are all defined according to observable behavior. And such behavior is essentially a response to factors operating in the environment. Thus, conflict with the environment is not innate nor assumed to be necessary but only occurs when man has been exposed to, and shaped by, conflicting external forces. If such is the case, behavioral patterns shaped by one set of environmental forces may be in conflict with behavioral patterns shaped by others. Yet, if all the forces operate in one direction, without conflict, as in B. F. Skinner's utopian novel, *Walden Two,* conflict will not exist.

Since man, behaviorally and thereby socially speaking, is created by his environment, the behaviorists' primary concern has been to create an environment in which man is rewarded for right-doing and punished for wrongdoing. Behavioristic research has contributed an impressive body of findings on how man learns to behave in socially accepted ways, how he develops self-sustaining values, and how he learns to resist temptation and stand up for what is right. Much of this evidence will be reviewed in a later chapter. The problem with behaviorism, however, is that there exist no guidelines for deciding what is "right." One assumes in the absence of such guidelines that what is right is what society or a subset of that society says is right. This can lead, of course, to many different and conflicting views of "rightness." It is with this problem, the problem of who decides what is right and what is wrong, that behaviorism encounters difficulties. Nevertheless this school of thought, in contrast to psychoanalysis, has increasingly over the past several years had much to say about classroom education in general and moral education in particular.

HUMANISTIC AND DEVELOPMENTAL SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

Humanistic and developmental schools of psychology have arisen over the past three decades in response to questions left unanswered by the previous two schools of thought. Neither psychoanalysis nor behaviorism allows for questioning of societal values, nor do they allow for such supposedly higher motivations as enduring love, courage, or regard for others. Rather, they are centered around a concept of man concerned primarily with himself and his own rewards. How, in fact, would they handle the following story told about Henry Thoreau? Thoreau was in jail for refusing to pay city taxes. His friend, Ralph Waldo Emerson, walked by his jail cell and to his surprise saw his friend inside the cell and called

through the window, "Henry, what are you doing in there?" Thoreau responded, "Waldo, what are you doing out there?" In this story the implication is that given those prevailing political circumstances any ethical person would find himself in jail. This is in sharp contrast to the societal view, adopted by the psychoanalysts and behaviorists, that jail is an appropriate punishment for wrongdoing and therefore ethical persons are by definition not found within its confines.

The conflict perceived in this story is heightened by the fact that Thoreau had generally been considered a man of high principle. Yet his principles resulted in his receiving the disapproval of society. Both psychoanalytic and behavioristic schools would have difficulty incorporating this example, and others of like nature, into their theories of adjustment to societal values. In addition, psychoanalysts and behaviorists have a difficult time accounting for the higher motivations of man which lead him to perform acts of love and courage with little regard for self. Freud, in attempting a partial explanation, denies that such motivations exist and finds that they are sublimations or derivatives of various unsatisfied instinctual impulses. As he wrote to a friend, such motivations do not reside in the attic of the human house for there is no attic, but rather in the basement below with the other unconscious and neurotic impulses. Likewise, the behaviorists also discount such impulses and claim they can be explained by environmental circumstances, although they have not done so to date.

Emphasis on Human Potential

Consequently, in the last 30 years a new school of thought has arisen which proceeds from an entirely different view of man. This view is generally termed Humanistic, founded on the principles of Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers, but has adherents from other perspectives, notably Alfred Adler, who was originally a psychoanalyst, and Lawrence Kohlberg, a developmentalist. These theorists see man as a creature of far greater potential than do the other two schools of thought: man is not necessarily controlled either by his internal impulses nor his external environment; he can freely choose and guide his life according to higher principles of truth, justice, beauty, and courage, for example. Moreover, since man has the capacity to develop universal principles transcending his own self-interest, he can often question and sometimes challenge the more limited views of his own society.

Therefore, the humanists disagree with both the behaviorists and the psychoanalysts on the following issues: (1) man is not limited to selfish concerns but can transcend his own self-interest in concern for others and adherence to higher principles; (2) man, though often influenced by internal and environmental forces, has the capacity to choose his own directions; and (3) since the values ordained by society are often limited and constricting and may at times not be in accord with higher principles, moral growth does not necessarily mean adjustment to society but sometimes requires that one challenge the society in which he lives.

The humanists postulate that man's nature is basically good, or at least neutral, and only by living in a destructive environment does he himself become destructive. Moreover, man's nature is not subdivided into internal and warring constructs, such as the id, ego and superego, but rather, in the fully developed man, his nature is integrated and holistic. From the basis of this integrated self, man can form an internal locus of evaluation by which he will guide himself toward a moral and ethical stance which will enhance his own being as well as that of others. Therefore, values for the humanists are determined primarily by the individual and not by society. Such values are personal and situational. And since man is essentially a harmonious creature, the development of, and action upon, such values will lead not to chaos or lawlessness, but to an integrated, harmonious, and well-functioning society. This is so since the fully functioning person acts on universal principles, the implementation of which can only benefit all humankind.

Such a view, it is argued, places an overwhelming trust in the nature of man. Nonetheless, there is evidence, both experimental and clinical, that such a view is not unfounded in fact. A person, if given a supportive environment and presented with a range of alternatives, will more often than not tend to choose well. And if he is mistaken he will tend to correct these errors quickly and resume a more ethical path. From such assumptions about human behavior one can, for example, better account for the willingness of a Thoreau to go to jail rather than pay what he regarded as unlawful taxes. On these assumptions and on a basic trust in the human organism, all humanistic theorists would agree.

Differences Among the Humanists

Within the humanistic camp, however, there are differences in the degree to which man is regarded as completely trustworthy, and differences in the weight given to rational and emotional factors in accounting for moral development. Kohlberg, for example, tends to see human moral development as purely a rational or cognitive process. Rogers, on the other hand, stresses the importance of emotional or affective processes and places more emphasis on freeing the perceptual system of emotional distortions. Adler, however, emphasizes both intellectual and emotional processes in his approach to moral development and in his approach to moral education. None of these theories, however, is necessarily incompatible with the other. From their differing vantage points each sheds its own particular light on moral developmental processes and each suggests its own particular way in which such development may be facilitated.

SUMMARY

In order to summarize the different viewpoints presented here, the chart is provided. To each question initially posed in this chapter the answers of the psychoanalysts and behaviorists and humanists are given. It must be remembered

that any such listing is bound to be incomplete and thus one to which any particular theorist might take exception. However, for instructional purposes and as a guide to sorting out the diverse viewpoints in the discussion to follow, such a listing has definite advantages.

	PSYCHOANALYSTS	BEHAVIORISTS	HUMANISTS
Nature of man	Partially negative	Neutral	Neutral to good
Determining forces	Internal: id, ego, superego	Environmental	Self-determined
Goal of man	Pleasure; freedom from pain and guilt	Pleasure; freedom from pain	Self-enhancement: truth, justice, beauty, courage, love
Relationship to society	Need to conform	Need to conform	Sometimes conform; sometimes challenge
Ultimate standard of values	Societal norms	Societal norms	Inner locus of evaluation, universal ethical principles
Role of formal classroom education in moral development	Minimal	Very significant	Very significant

It is apparent from the listing that the psychoanalysts and behaviorists share a limited view of man and the humanists a much more exalted one. The limited view presupposes the need for restraints imposed by society. The more exalted view of man presupposes no particular need for restraints and finds that sometimes the individual himself can or will be the arbiter and critic of society. The limited view of man presupposes that man cannot be trusted; the humanistic view argues for placing our trust in man. Where do you stand?

PART II

CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO MORAL EDUCATION

CHAPTER 4

Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Judgment

THE CAPACITY FOR MORAL JUDGMENT

Emphasis in the cognitive-developmental approach to moral judgment is given to the individual child's, adolescent's, or young adult's growing capacity to make moral judgment of the highest order consistent with his stage of development. This is based on the assumption that the mechanism for rational morality is the same as for rational or cognitive activity in general.

Cognitive Development

The capacity for intellectual or cognitive activity results from the interaction of the organism and the environment. The key word here is "interaction." This is not an approach based on a deterministic view of man which sees either internal drives alone or external forces alone accounting for human behavior. Information from the environment is perceived in accordance with the individual's own particular stage of growth; further growth is realized when the individual experiences the information as dissonant or inconsistent with his prior view and restructures his cognitive representation of the world accordingly.

Jean Piaget of Geneva, Switzerland, has done much of the pioneering work on cognitive-developmental processes. But it has been Lawrence Kohlberg of Harvard University who has in the last decade and a half become the primary investigator of these processes as they relate to moral judgment. Kohlberg views his work as being based on Piaget's research and as providing the theoretical ground on which the legacy of John Dewey may be realized.

The Processes of Development

Kohlberg points out that cognitive development is a process of relatively orderly change taking place over a period of time as the individual matures. This is not, however, an automatic process. Although the environment may not directly affect the mental structures and organization of a particular stage, environmental stimulation may increase or retard the rate of progress through each stage. This is the root of Kohlberg's great interest in educational reform.

The same processes which apply to cognitive development Kohlberg applies also to moral development. Stages of moral growth depend upon the innate organizing tendency of the human organism, but they are not specifically or

genetically "wired into the organism."[1] Similarly, formation of mental structures about moral problems or concerns is dependent upon experience but is not the mere reflection of the person's culture and external environment. Kohlberg maintains, rather, that moral judgment stages are the product of interactional experience between the person and the external environment, experience which leads to a restructuring of the person's own cognitive organization rather than to the direct imposition of any cultural pattern.

Comparison to IQ Levels

Before proceeding to a description of Kohlberg's six stages of moral development and his suggestions for educational reform, certain additional considerations must be presented. First of all, cognitive stage maturity is not the same as IQ, though the two are highly correlated.[2] While hereditary components of cognition may affect the rate of information processing, and thereby influence the rate at which an individual moves through invariant cognitive sequences, experiential factors more heavily influence the rate of cognitive-structural development. If this were not true, Kohlberg's approach would have little relevance for educators.

Kohlberg and others have conducted experiments with children considered to be "culturally disadvantaged." These children tend to be somewhat retarded on tests of moral judgment when compared to middle-class children with the same IQ's. However, experimental interaction was able, to some extent, to accelerate development and, thereby, close the gap. Kohlberg has concluded that, regardless of IQ, "general impoverishment of organized physical and social stimulation leads to retardation in stage development," while the opposite condition leads to swifter sequential movement from one stage to another.[3]

Implications for Behavior

Second, Kohlberg distinguishes between moral judgment and moral behavior. His distinction is similar to that made by Dewey. Moral judgment, which refers to intellectual or cognitive capacities, is viewed as a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral behavior. "Ego strength" is also needed.[4] Kohlberg believes moral judgment constitutes a cognitive definition of the situation and that this definition determines the highest possible level of choice in a moral conflict. Emotional considerations may, however, affect the actual behavior.

Distinction of Moral Judgment and Cognitive Development

Finally, Kohlberg also distinguishes between development in moral judgment and cognitive development. Just as moral judgment maturity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral behavior, so is cognitive development a necessary but not sufficient condition for development in moral judgment.[5] For instance, while the highest Piagetian cognitive developmental stage of "formal operations" may be necessary for Kohlberg's highest level of moral judgment,

principled morality, an individual may be a theoretical physicist and yet not make moral judgments of the principled level. What is lacking in the life of such an individual are those specific opportunities for environmental interaction which involve moral conflict. In discussing the moral development of adolescents, Kohlberg writes:

> The shift in adolescence from concrete to formal operations, the ability now to see the given as only a subset of the possible and to spin out the alternatives, constitutes the necessary precondition for the transition from conventional to principled moral reasoning. It is in adolescence, then, that the child has the cognitive capability for moving from a conventional to a postconventional, reflective or philosophic view of values and society.[6]

SIX STAGES OF MORAL GROWTH

Cognitive-developmental stages and moral stages are stages of structure, not of content. They are structures of thought through which all persons move sequentially. They do not tell specifically what is on a person's mind, but only how a person thinks about what is on his mind.

Sequential Nature of Moral Development

Kohlberg views the six stages as forming an invariant developmental sequence in which attainment of an advanced stage is dependent on the attainment of each of the preceding stages. Individuals may move through these stages at varying speeds and may be found half in and half out of a particular stage. An individual may stop at any given stage and at any age, and according to Kohlberg the vast majority of persons in the United States do come to a stop by age twenty-five, but if an individual continues to move, he must move in accord with the stages.[7] Moral judgment at the conventional level never occurs before the preconventional Stage 1 and Stage 2 thought has occurred. No adult in Stage 3 or Stage 4 has gone through Stage 6, but all Stage 6 adults have gone through the conventional stages (see below).[8]

A. *The Preconventional Child* considers labels of good or bad in terms of their physical consequences (punishment, reward) or in terms of the physical powers of those who establish the rules and apply the labels.
   Stage 1: Punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of an action determine its goodness or badness, regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning obedience are valued in their own right.
   Stage 2: Instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others.
B. *The Conventional Level* refers to conformism. Maintaining the expectations and rules of the individual's family, group, or nation is considered as valuable in its own right.
   Stage 3: Interpersonal concordance (good boy-nice girl) orientation. Good is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. Discord is avoided.

Stage 4: Orientation toward authority ("law and order"). Obedience of authority, fixed rules for their own sake and for the maintenance of the status quo for the purpose of social order.

C. *The Postconventional Level* is characterized by a major thrust toward autonomous moral principles that have universal validity and application apart from the personal or legal authority of the groups and persons who hold them and apart from the individual's personal identification with those persons or groups.

Stage 5: Social contract-orientation. Proper conduct tends to be defined in terms of general rights and standards that have been agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the variety of personal values and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Emphasis is on the rule of laws not men. This is the official morality of democratic nations.

Stage 6: Universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined as a decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule) and not concrete moral rules. At heart, these are principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of humankind.

EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENTAL STAGE APPROACH

To claim that there are hierarchial stages of moral judgment is to maintain that a new stage does not simply replace a previous stage, nor does it simply build on the older one, but rather "it transforms elements of the lower stage into a new, more differentiated and integrated structure."[9] Experimental evidence for this claim has been provided by Kohlberg and several others.[10]

For instance, one of these investigators, Turiel, examined the postulation that Kohlberg's stages form an invariant sequence by testing the implication that movement to a moral stage differing from an individual's own should be to the stage directly above the individual's stage, rather than to any other stage.[11] He found evidence to confirm his two hypotheses: (1) subjects exposed to reasoning directly above their dominant stage would be influenced more than those exposed to stages farther above their own; (2) subjects tended to resist reasoning at a lower stage. And in his latest study, as yet unpublished, Rest found that statements at stages above the subject's own stage are increasingly more difficult to comprehend, and that statements at levels below are comprehended even though the subject does not spontaneously prefer these levels.[12] He also found that insofar as subjects comprehend various stages of thinking, they tend to prefer the highest stage comprehended, this also being the one spontaneously maintained in an interview.

Evidence from Cross-cultural Studies

Empirical evidence has also been found to support the claim of universality of sequence.[13]Cross-cultural studies were completed in a number of different coun-

tries and cultures: a Taiwanese city, a Malaysian aboriginal tribal village, a Turkish village, as well as in various parts of the United States and Mexico. Results imply that moral development is not merely a matter of learning the verbal values or rules of the individual's cultures, but reflect a similar sequence of development in all cultures. However, the findings do indicate a difference in rate of development between social classes in a country. In preliterate or tribal communities, postconventional moral thought appears to be absent or at least not clearly developed.

Philosophical Foundation of Stages

Kohlberg's work has led him to further elaboration of his six stages in terms of universal values.[14] Each of his stages is additionally defined by basic aspects of moral values. These have been determined by Kohlberg to be the central issues with which philosophers of ethics have traditionally and historically been concerned. They are the issues with which all men living in human society must come to terms, and hence, are issues which are personally relevant to every man. For instance, comparing cognitive stage development with moral stage development, both being forms of "psychological equilibrium," Kohlberg views "justice" as an "imminent condition of social relationships" which governs their equilibrium.[15] Other aspects are "conscience" or the motive given for rule obedience or moral action. Another is "the value of human life." Apparently, he considers the value of human life to be an issue of more definitive significance, since it is more often repeated in the literature and since it is included in both the pretests and post-tests that are available for testing. The following is an example of how the six stages are defined on this issue:

1. The value of a human life is confused with the value of physical objects and is based on the social status or physical attributes of its possessor.
2. The value of a human life is seen as instrumental to the satisfaction of the needs of its possessor or of other persons.
3. The value of a human life is based on the empathy and affection of family members and others toward its possessor.
4. Life is conceived as sacred in terms of its place in a categorical moral or religious order of rights and duties.
5. Life is valued both in terms of its relation to community welfare and in terms of being a universal human right.
6. Belief in the sacredness of human life as representing a universal human value of respect for the individual.[16]

The significance of human life as defined by each of the six stages is one example of how Kohlberg's stages apply to ethical issues facing mankind. Kohlberg finds this process of valuing to be sequential, invariant, and universal. One moves from a perception of oneself as most important in an egocentric world to an identification with all men and thus to an ethical view which culminates in a "definition of human life as centrally valuable" rather than derived from, or dependent upon, institutional or divine authority.[17]

This last statement illuminates the nature of Kohlberg's theory: as one progresses upward one becomes increasingly aware, identified with, and empathic toward a larger circle of humankind. At the earliest stages one values only oneself in a primitive, pleasure-seeking manner. At the last stage, one's perception clears so that one is definitely aware of one's bond with all men. According to Kohlberg, "moral development is largely a process of restructuring universal human tendencies of empathy (concern for the welfare of others) and of justice (concern for equality and reciprocity) in more adequate forms."[18]

IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

Kohlberg is a strong advocate of education for moral character, if character here is defined primarily in developmental terms. He maintains that character development is primarily cognitive: that is, those who perceive themselves as interdependent with larger and larger groups of mankind, those who see that their own fortunes are closely linked to those of others will normally act accordingly, realizing that what they do to another they do also to themselves. Thus, Kohlberg finds that action often follows upon cognition.

Evidence from the Classroom

An illustration of this view lies in the following studies measuring moral behavior in children and adolescents. In one study 80 percent of the sixth graders, all of whom had received traditional admonitions against cheating, cheated somewhat during the teacher's absence. The majority of those at the preconventional level cheated a great deal and the majority at the conventional level cheated a slight or moderate amount.[19] They all later defined the issue of cheating or not cheating along lines representative of their respective stages. In contrast, adolescents at the postconventional level interpreted cheating or not cheating along principled lines involving issues of trust, contract, and social agreement. The one postconventional sixth grader did not cheat at all. And among a group of college students less than 10 percent of postconventional students cheated while 50 percent of the conventional students did so.[20] These test results support Kohlberg's contention that tests reflective of basic cognitive structures of moral judgment are good predictors of moral behavior.

Kohlberg's approach to increasing the levels of moral behavior is thus a cognitive one. He suggests that young people be presented with hypothetical moral dilemmas which cause them, through discussion and resolution, to differentiate and integrate their values at a higher level. Further, the hypothetical dilemmas should be aimed, as much as is possible in a group situation, at a stage one level above the students' spontaneous stage levels, thus expanding upon and then consolidating a view compatible with the students' own development. He suggests that teachers aim their arguments toward those students at the lower stage levels to begin with and then advance toward the higher stages. In this regard, initially

higher stage students can be quite instrumental in classroom discussions. This approach, then, aids the student in taking the next step in a direction toward which he is already tending, rather than imposing upon him an alien pattern.[21]

Blatt tested this approach with a group of 12 children, ages eleven and twelve.[22] Group discussion of moral problems were held. Children discussed and argued hypothetical dilemmas. The teacher supported and clarified arguments of the children which were at an average level (Stage 3) as compared to those arguments one stage lower. When these arguments seemed understood, the teacher used new situations and challenged the stage previously supported, while supporting those arguments one stage higher (Stage 4). Sixty percent of the children showed marked development as compared to only 10 percent of the control group.[23]

Importance of Using Moral Dilemmas in Classroom Instruction

Education for moral character is primarily, then, the stimulating of development in moral judgment. This is best accomplished, according to Kohlberg, through the presentation of moral dilemmas which involve the student in a discussion of the conflicts inherent in the situations. This discussion is facilitated by the teacher using role-playing techniques, and/or asking questions which probe into the complexities of the dilemma, but only after students have already spontaneously responded to initial questions.

An example of teaching using a hypothetical moral dilemma concerned with the motive given for rule obedience is as follows. Students are asked what they would do in the following made-up situation: suppose you and several friends were in a department store and the others all decided to slip a few store items into their jackets and just walk out. What would you do? If confronted with a situation like this, teachers could expect that students at the Stage 3 level of conformity (good boy-nice girl) might well argue that stealing in this instance is not so bad, since everybody else does it. What is morally wrong to such students is not doing what the group wants to do. The teacher might then suggest a role play in which one or more students take turns being the store owner or a member of his family. The students might then discover on their own that the store owner needs to make a profit to provide for his family. Through their own experience of empathy with the store owner, the students may progress to a Stage 4 concern for law and order in society.

In much of his work in the public schools, Kohlberg has used discussion groups for instructional purposes. He strongly rejects the notion of a set of curriculum instruction and exhortation in conventional values. In an effort to make Dewey's own remarks quite blunt and to the point, Kohlberg wrote: "In order to be more than 'Mickey Mouse,' a teacher's moralizings must be cognitively novel and challenging to the child, and they must be related to matters of obvious, real importance and seriousness."[24]

Although he does not provide empirical evidence to prove this contention, Kohlberg rejects the notion, at least as far as adolescents and young adults are

concerned, that the content of the moral dilemmas revolve around immediate and real-life issues of the classroom. Rather, he prefers "hypothetical and remote, but obviously morally real and challenging conflict situations."[25] Only such situations, Kohlberg maintains, involve the student in dilemmas for which the adult right answer is not obviously at hand to discourage the student's own moral thought.

An example of a hypothetical moral dilemma concerned with the value of human life could be put together by the teacher around the contemporary and controversial subject of whether or not doctors should use "life support" systems in what are otherwise terminally ill cases in hospitals. This situation might be appropriate for high school students in social studies or health classes. Students at Stage 4, for instance, might argue that doctors must preserve life by every means at their disposal, because to do otherwise is against the law; whereas students at Stage 5 might argue for the same immediate action, but also suggest that the present laws be reexamined, and if found wanting in light of recent technological advances, be changed accordingly. A student tending toward Stage 6 might suggest that first the doctor take autonomous action (unplug the system) on the basis of a belief in a universal right to die and then allow the courts and eventually the appropriate legislative authority to decide his fate as well as the issue. Again, the stage of a student's moral maturity does not tell one what answer he will give to a dilemma, but only how his answer will be structured.

One last matter must be commented upon. Although, according to Kohlberg, the crux of a program of moral education should center on the stimulation of development in moral judgment, this alone, he asserts, is not sufficient.[26] The ability to make moral judgments is only one portion of moral character. The remainder is the ability to apply these judgmental capacities in real-life action. This was Dewey's opinion as well. Kohlberg admits that: although present research is positive on the point, it is not yet certain whether educational stimulation of moral judgment will actually produce more mature conduct in conflict situations.[27] In any case, he maintains, "in addition to stimulating the development of general moral judgment capacities, a developmental moral education would stimulate the child's application of his own moral judgments (not the teacher's) to his actions."[28]

Personal Relevancy of Approach

Kohlberg's suggestions for stimulating moral growth also pertain to the question of personal relevancy in character education. In order to encourage the application of the individual student's own values to his behavior, it is necessary to make sure that the kinds of behavior demands that are made upon the student have some match to his already existing moral values.[29] According to Kohlberg, two major types of mismatch occur. First, if the teacher insists on behavioral conformity to trivial classroom routines by moralizing about them, the student will simply assume that his own moral values have no relevance to his life in the

classroom. Kohlberg advocates that administrative demands be treated as such and clearly distinguished from basic moral demands which involve judgments of the student's worth and moral sanctions.

The second mismatch occurs, however, whenever this distinction is not genuinely possible for the teacher himself, that is, whenever the teacher believes that certain behavioral demands are genuine moral demands, but for which the student has not yet developed any moral values that require the particular behavior. For instance, an effort to force a young child to agree that an act of cheating is very bad when he does not really believe it, will only be effective in encouraging morally immature tendencies toward expedient outward compliance.[30] In general, Kohlberg maintains, the teacher should encourage the child to develop moral values relevant to such behavior as cheating but should not treat the behavior as a moral demand in the absence of such values. In regard to a developmental conception of moral education, Kohlberg writes: "Most important, it implies that the teacher starts to listen carefully to the child in moral communications. It implies that he becomes concerned about the child's moral judgments (and the relation of the child's behavior to these judgments) rather than about conformity of the child's behavior or judgments to the teacher's own."[31]

Thus, Kohlberg's approach is personally relevant in matching education to the developmental stage of the student. It can be reasonably argued, however, that the content of instruction is not necessarily or always relevant to the immediate life of the student, since Kohlberg chooses to present situations which are remote from the student's life so that pat answers are not easily found. In terms of the content of classroom discussion, Kohlberg's suggestions imply a lesser degree of personal relevancy than might otherwise be the case. The approaches in the chapters to follow tend to be stronger on the issue of personal relevancy, but perhaps less strong on the issue of moral judgment itself. The reader, however, can judge this for himself.

CHAPTER 5

Individual Psychology

RECONSIDERATION OF THE SOCIAL-ADJUSTMENT APPROACH

Earlier, it was pointed out that the social-adjustment approach to moral education has increasingly been considered as inadequate by many educators. This is, of course, not always the case. Actually, the practitioners of the approach sought to avoid moral terms altogether and concentrate simply on the mental health of the student. One advantage seen in this "non-approach" was that any concern with ethical relativity could supposedly be laid to rest. It was thought for a long while that a neutral stance in regard to moral considerations was not only desirable but also possible. Then the attacks on this approach mounted. That such neutrality was possible was vigorously questioned. The approach eventually began to fall into disfavor as educators and others began to agree that mental health labels were not neutral and were often being used to make value judgments about individual behavior.

While these developments in the area of mental health and public education were proceeding, a particular approach to community mental health began and continues to gain wide support among parents and school officials. Although it aims toward social-adjustment, it does not claim to be neutral on questions of moral behavior. Neither does it try to sidestep the issue of ethical relativity by proclaiming the superiority of one particular group value system. And neither does it operate under what many consider the rather dangerous leadership of specialized mental health professionals. Such groups may reasonably be viewed as such, since adherence to the specialist's opinion in matters of morals may be no more effective in moving away from indoctrination in our schools than continuing to leave hidden the hidden curriculum of moral education.

The approach in question derives from a school of psychology founded in Europe earlier in the century. This school is called Individual Psychology and its founder was Alfred Adler, an original disciple of Sigmund Freud, but one who later fell into irreconcilable disagreement with the master and established his own independent following. One of his followers, Rudolf Dreikurs, became, along with Adler himself, quite involved with the public schools in Vienna. Dreikurs later settled in this country and continued his interest in education and what may be called preventive mental health or community psychology.

Dreikurs has been the foremost follower of Adler in the United States and the one most responsible for transforming Adler's individual psychology from the

more traditional and rather exclusive practice of professionally trained clinicians to the practice of laywomen and laymen in their everyday lives of work, family, and friendship. Dreikurs's approach to moral education may be viewed, therefore, as an attempt to translate the relevant principles of Adlerian psychology into a form more easily understandable, useful, and personally relevant to lay persons in local communities. In the discussion which follows, therefore, the basic principles of this school are drawn from the work of Adler, whereas the application more often from the work of Dreikurs.

INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MORAL PRINCIPLES

Holistic View of Man

The foundation of Adlerian theory rests upon the concept of the unity of self and the embeddedness of the self in a social context. One cannot look at one aspect of the self, such as moral judgment (e.g., reason or ethics), apart from the totality of self, nor can one examine one person apart from his societal community. Adler wrote, "Individual Psychology accepts the viewpoint of the complete unity and self-consistency of the individual whom it regards and examines as socially embedded."[1]

Concept of Social Interest

Compatible with this holistic view of man is Adler's concept of man's innate potential for *Gemeinschaftsgefühl,* or as it is most often translated, "social interest." Social interest leads to the awareness of our interdependency with others existing outside the self. From this awareness comes the basis for an ethical system in which that which benefits the welfare of all is also that which most facilitates an individual's personal growth. Adler states: "What we call justice, considering it the bright side of the human character, is essentially nothing other than the fulfillment of demands which have arisen from man's communal life. . . . Dependability, loyalty, frankness, and truthfulness are actually demands posited and maintained by a generally valid principle of the community."[2] Further, it is not only ethical values but esthetic values as well which spring from the awareness of social interest: "Not only the ethical nature, but the right attitude in aesthetics, the best understanding of the beautiful and the ugly, will always be founded upon the truest social feeling."[3]

Thus, the development of social interest requires the development of a system of values compatible with the awareness of man's interdependency with others. Social interest is "an evaluative attitude toward life."[4] With the growth of social interest, Adler finds that one learns "to see with the eyes of another, to hear with the ears of another, to feel with the heart of another."[5] Social interest, therefore, involves all the faculties of an individual: sensing, feeling, and thinking.

Adler further defines two of the most important aspects of social interest: empathy and identification. "Empathy and understanding are facts of social

feeling, of harmony with the universe. . . . The capacity for identification, which alone makes us capable of friendships, love of mankind, sympathy, occupation and love, is the basis of social interest and can be practiced and exercised only in conjunction with others."[6] The basis of social interest and the values deriving from the growth of social interest thus lie in one's ability to perceive and to feel one's relationship to widening circles of mankind and to act for the welfare of all of those with whom one identifies.

The Need for Training

Although the potential for such an ethical system, based on social interest, is innate, it must be developed and trained. It is a human potential which can be easily negated by neurotic strivings for power in which one views one's own welfare as over and against the welfare of others. Such an individual striving for his own personal power "expects a contribution from the group in which he lives, while the normal individual strives toward the perfection which benefits all."[7] Further, such an individual is bound by his own self-interest and in effect ultimately defeats himself by neglecting the inner stirrings of social interest: "The self-bound individual always forgets that his self would be safeguarded better and automatically the more he prepares himself for the welfare of mankind, and that in this respect no limits are set for him."[8]

In order to counteract such a neurotic development, the child's social interest must be trained and supported in communal living. Social interest is always present, however weak it is or overpowered by other partial drives, and education must proceed upon the basis of the degree to which this social interest exists: "The educability of the child derives from the breadth of his innate, differentiated, and growing social interest."[9] In favorable circumstances, the child learns to develop social interest within his own family first, and from this basis, with continued growth, social interest may extend "to the larger group, to the nation, to all of mankind.[10] Gradually expanding spheres of empathy and identification, of social interest, will cause man to develop an ethical system which benefits all of those with whom he identifies, in the most evolved cases, all of mankind.

The Existence of Universal Values

Adler implies that the values which benefit mankind are those which could be agreed upon universally. In various places throughout his writings he mentions justice, truth, and beauty as the qualities perceived and valued by those who have an "ideal" amount of social interest. With this universality of values he also implies an innate basis for the development of such values. He states that "the very existence of mankind is inseparably tied up with being good."[11]

Adler's ethical system has many factors in common with that of Kohlberg, reviewed previously. The basis for the development of values lies within one's capacity or potential for identification with all mankind. From this universal identification spring the values of truth, justice, and beauty. These values are universal and exist among the most developed people in any society.

Kohlberg and Adler

The primary distinction from Kohlberg, however, appears in Adler's holistic view of man. Man cannot be adequately understood without understanding him in his totality. Man's reason does not operate apart from his feelings, man's ethics apart from his feelings and thoughts. The healthy individual, well-integrated within himself, will have developed social interest and a high ethical code. Fürtmüller, an early Adlerian disciple, writes: "According to this idea, ethics and mental hygiene arrive at a particularly close relationship. It is not as if ethics could be a means toward mental health. On the contrary, mental health appears, rather, to be a prerequisite for genuine ethics. Everything designed to reduce the intrapsychic tensions described above will also mitigate antisocial and unethical tendencies."[12] Adler, in fact, points out that intelligence, or rationality, separated from the feeling, sensing side of self, can argue for any cause and any decision. While reason is necessary for an ethical code it is not sufficient: "The degree of social interest determines whether his intellectual solution of a problem will have general validity."[13] Thus Adler's theory is holistic, whereas Kohlberg's is purely cognitive. This is the major difference between the two theorists in respect to moral development.

Theoretical Contributions of Dreikurs

The work of Dreikurs has further elaborated Adler's approach to moral development. As early as 1934, Dreikurs addressed a congress of educators in Europe on "The Meaning of *Gemeinschaftsgefühl* for Moral Education."[14] In this address he made an appeal to educators and other relevant professionals to become cognizant of the importance of the mental health or emotional well-being of their students for the purposes of moral development. He acknowledged the reality of cultural relativism as regards particular modes of human interaction, but nevertheless, affirmed the existence of an "irrational root of ethical feeling," a "universal *Gemeinshaft* of all men."[15]

Years later Dreikurs emphasized the importance of a holistic approach to moral education which included development of the emotions. He spoke in opposition to any appeal which would overemphasize moral obligation or moral judgment. This would not only be of "little avail when we have decided to take action," but "further appeal to it [moral judgment] increases only the feeling of frustration or the feeling of guilt; neither of them is conducive toward a more adequate attitude."[16] He maintained in this address that our moral attitudes, "supported by our emotions, are the result of our personal evaluation, whether we are aware of our reasoning or not."[17]

Later in a pamphlet entitled "Character Education and Spiritual Values in an Anxious Age," Dreikurs returned to this theme and made clear his opposition to any approach of moral education which did not include an "emotional appeal": "Since our private logic is fortified by our emotions which justify our attitudes and actions, the emotional appeal becomes extremely important in influencing attitudes and concepts. Deep and lasting influences cannot be exerted without

enthusiasm, without joy and emotional satisfaction."[18] Again, Dreikurs emphasizes, as does Adler, the holistic approach to moral growth, deriving from a base of social interest or *Gemeinschaftsgefühl.*

PRACTICAL TRAINING FOR TEACHERS AND PARENTS IN CHILD GUIDANCE

Interpretive Approach

Dreikurs's technique in individual and group counseling or in study groups is that of interpreting the client or group member to himself. He cautions against non-directive counseling techniques, such as that practiced by Carl Rogers (see next chapter), maintaining that "there is no chance in any human cooperation to be truly non-directive. We influence each other by merely being together."[19] Furthermore, such approaches assume "that the good sense of the client is sufficient to lead him to proper solutions, if his reasoning power is stimulated by questions."[20] He writes that this is not possible, that men require further guidance. "Nobody knows himself completely. What he knows are his wishes, desires, and intentions as far as they are reconcilable with his conscience. He does not realize his fundamental attitude towards life, his life-style, nor is he always aware of his true intentions, his real attitudes towards others in the given situation."[21] Such lack of self-knowledge can result in "destructive attitudes," which can be clarified through guided discussion:

> Destructive attitudes are always based on the client's wrong evaluation of himself. We are all conditioned to succumb to inferiority feelings, partly as members of the human race, but particularly through our childhood experiences. Feeling to be less than others in a group prevents cooperation and constructive action and limits the development of social interest, of the feeling of belonging. Inferiority feelings stimulate fear and resentment, as the feeling of belonging and self-confidence leads to courage and acceptance. A discussion of the client's concepts, evaluation and interpretations of himself and of the existing problem can demonstrate his errors and mistakes in judgment and stimulate a new attitude.[22]

Community Associations and Activities

Dreikurs advocates, and has been instrumental in establishing, widespread study groups in which interested groups of parents and educators can meet with a professional or lay leader to read and discuss their difficulties in relating to children and adults. Such study groups are generally sponsored by local family education centers, community guidance centers, or particular public schools, with the support of the local chapter of the Individual Psychology Association.

It perhaps should be noted that local study groups are not concerned with questions relating to the theoretical rationale behind Adlerian principles of teacher-student relations.[23] Rather, attention is focused directly on the practical benefits that immediately accrue to any person or group that cares to experiment. In

this approach lies the strength of the movement. The Individual Psychology Association is providing teachers and parents of widely divergent backgrounds —some formally educated, many not—with something that they can get their hands on, something they can implement fairly soon and with which they can see results right away. Also noteworthy is the fact that it is not only the moral growth of the children which results from these training sessions. The teachers and parents themselves also undergo significant transformations of character as a result of their reading and their interacting together in groups.[24]

Generally, regardless of institutional connections, centers rely upon professionals acting as consultants during initial growth periods, but are otherwise and eventually staffed only by trained volunteers. Centers are designed to be educational in nature. They are not psychiatric clinics and are not for the treatment of abnormal behavior. In comparison to community mental health projects, they constitute a preventive program rather than a treatment program. The objectives of the centers are simply to teach families and other interested groups, especially public school teachers, administrators, and children, to live and work together harmoniously in a democratic atmosphere.

A center's weekly activities consist primarily of the study groups. Beginning study groups often use *Children: The Challenge* by Dreikurs as a text. They may later advance to other works by Dreikurs such as *Psychology in the Classroom, Maintaining Sanity in the Classroom, Encouraging Children to Learn,* and *Logical Consequences.* Manuals for the group leaders are often available and these aid in getting discussion going and in keeping them near the text. An unofficial motto of many groups is "study is a necessary forerunner to action." But apparently persons in attendance do not wait long to experiment in their own professional and personal lives with what they are learning in groups.[25] Discussions more often than not center around the problems and successes experienced in this regard.

Groups initially begin with the study of parent-child relations and/or teacher-child relations. In the child's relation to his parents is the beginning of the development of a moral code based on social interest. As social interest widens, the child identifies with his family and then his school as his immediate community and ceases to act only for himself. With further maturation and development in favorable circumstances he can later extend this identification to all mankind with the concomitant system of moral values. However, the root of this system of values begins in the home and continues in the school: thus the initial interests, parent-child relations and teacher-child relations.

Application to Children

In such groups guidelines for parents and teachers are read in various books and manuals and applied to particular situations. The emphasis in reading and discussion is upon allowing the child to experience the logical consequences of his actions. This is the best preparation for responsible and democratic living. In

a democracy, according to Dreikurs, "logical consequences" express the reality of the social order; whereas, punishment expresses simply the power of a personal authority.[26]

Translated into a more concrete guideline for interrelating with a child, logical consequences are said to be established by parents and teachers, but nevertheless are direct and logical—not arbitrarily imposed—consequences of the transgression.[27] For example: a child is continually late returning from recess. The teacher may deliberately schedule immediately after recess a group learning situation which he or she knows will be greatly enjoyed by participants. Instead of reprimanding the late child, the teacher quietly and politely points out that the child will have to sit this one out, since it is already underway. Regardless of the child's reaction, the teacher maintains a friendly attitude and a firm manner, based on the assumption that the child made his own choice in the matter, that he had a right to that choice, and that he or she must now live with the logical consequences of the choice.

Natural consequences are the direct result of the child's behavior in relation to his physical universe. A child is careless, falls down, gets bruised. Next time he will be more careful. In this instance, as well as in interpersonal relations, the child is allowed to experience the consequences of his own action. He becomes motivated toward proper behavior through his personal and direct experience of the world.

Personal Relevancy of Approach

The approach is personally relevant in that it allows children to deal directly and autonomously with the school situations in which they are involved. The implications for moral growth in such an approach are apparent. The child learns to take responsibility for himself and his own actions. Teachers learn to allow the child to be himself and discover his own world. The struggle for power over others, teacher against child, is minimized. In this respect, Dreikurs wrote the following regarding the role of the teacher:

> In the past, her main function was considered to be instruction and indoctrination. But we have become increasingly aware that the function of the school is to provide more than formal knowledge. It must help the child in his social adjustment and train him in the ways of democratic living. For this reason, each educator plays an active part in the development of the child's personality. She is in a position to change, shape, or entrench the goals and attitudes of each child.[28]

In democratic interaction with his teacher and with his classmates, the child learns that he need not seek power over others or expand himself at the expense of others. Rather, he can grow in empathy and understanding within his school community as he becomes realistically aware of his world. This is the training ground for developing social interest and the furtherance of moral growth.

CHAPTER 6

The Organismic Approach of Carl Rogers

Carl Rogers, theoretician, therapist, and educator, is well known for his approach to non-directive learning, whether it be in therapy, in groups, or in the classroom. His basic argument rests on the assumption, supported by clinical and empirical research, that in a non-threatening environment man comes to know his inner self, that this is an appropriate base from which to make choices and develop values, and that the direction that a person thus chooses is one which is beneficial for himself, for his community, and indeed for the human race. Though this theory has some similarities with those of both Adler and Kohlberg, his approach to education is the most non-directive and personally relevant of the three, in that it omits all external structure and relies solely on the personal revelations and interactions of those involved.

MORAL DEVELOPMENT: EMPHASIS ON THE WHOLE PERSON

Rogers's theoretical view stems from a holistic view of man which is basically positive: "One of the most revolutionary concepts to grow out of our clinical experience is the growing recognition that the innermost core of man's nature, the deepest layers of his personality, the base of his 'animal nature,' is positive in nature—is basically socialized, forward-moving, rational and realistic."[1] When a person comes to know his inner core, truly experiences his own organism, he acts in a way which is eventually both self-enhancing as well as socially constructive. When a person acts in such a manner, his "locus of evaluation" is within himself: "less and less does he look to others for approval or disapproval; for standards to live by; for decisions and choices."[2] Such a person may not be conventional, for he makes his choices independent of convention; such behavior may not conform to that of his fellows, for choices are made independently of what others think and do. The choices made by a person, aware of himself and trusting himself, will come from his own rational, feeling, and intuitive judgment of what is right. They will be individualized, but due to the positive nature of man, they will also be socialized.[3]

Rogers points out that decisions made on the basis of this internal evaluation process are not always correct or self-enhancing. Choices made on one's own "feel" for the situation are not simple and easy but perplexing and difficult. There is "no guarantee that a choice will be self-actualizing."[4] But errors are readily correctable by those allowing the organism to continually assess the situation, to

make new choices, to live in process. "To be responsibly self-directing means that one chooses—and then learns from the consequences."[5]

Therefore, Rogers sees man as having the potential to make his own wise, self-enhancing choices. Since man is basically good, these choices will be highly ethical or moral, in that they will enhance the welfare of the individual and others with whom he lives.

The Prerequisite: Openness to Experience

However, this potential only comes into being in those people who allow themselves to be totally open to their experience. Those people who shut out part of their experience, ignore their internal feelings, or distort incoming information to minimize threat will not have a trustworthy base for making ethical decisions. Their information is incomplete and distorted. Such people are unable to trust the center of themselves, for they are not in contact with it and have no potential for developing an ethical system from within. In such a case they may place their locus of evaluation on others in the environment and respond in terms of punishment and reward, self-aggrandizement, or standard mores, codes, and laws. They rely on what Rogers terms "introjected values," similar to Kohlberg's preconventional and conventional levels of moral judgment.

Openness Requires a Safe Environment

In order for such people to develop a trustworthy inner locus of evaluation, they require a non-threatening environment in which they can, without fear, begin to explore those parts of their experience which they have shut out of awareness.[6] As more and more of their experience is integrated and absorbed, their perception of themselves is more fluid, flexible, and open—and more trustworthy.[7] In a nonthreatening environment—such as may be found in therapy or group situations, or in some personal relationships—a person learns more and is more able and willing to accept who he is and to be all he is. His own internally experienced valuing process and the moral decisions made from being who he is will be beneficial to himself and his fellows.

Therefore, it is clear that the base for highly ethical decisions is found within a person, but only within persons displaying high degrees of openness and awareness, or in Rogers's terminology, in "fully functioning" individuals. It would seem, then, that in order to facilitate moral growth the healthy functioning of the individual needs to be tended to first. This is a prerequisite. Out of awareness of experience grows trust in oneself; from this base springs organismic values which benefit all men.

The Valuing Process and Its Results

Three points concerning Rogers's theory of values require further emphasis. First, man's values come from being in touch with his *whole* self, not just his rationality. Therefore, values and moral choices are not just cognitive in origin.

In fact, they may not even be totally conscious.[8] The values emerge from a perception and weighing of all internal and external evidence so that a decision based on these values "feels right," though the person may not be rationally able to explain exactly why he feels this way. The holistic nature of these perceptions and resultant values is restated by Rogers several times, as in the following: "He realizes that he can trust all of himself, his feelings and his intuitions may be wiser than his mind, that as a total person he can be more sensitive and accurate than his thoughts alone."[9] The first point is, therefore, that the valuing process and hence moral growth is holistic in nature, involving intuitions, feelings, and thoughts.

The second point is that, although the criterion for ethical choice is one's own self-enhancement, making the person "richer, more complete, more fully developed,"[10] the emerging choices are highly socialized and display Adlerian social interest, or *Gemeinschaftsgefühl:*

> We do not need to ask who will socialize him, for one of his own deepest needs is for affiliation and communication with others. As he becomes more fully himself, he will become more realistically socialized. We do not need to ask who will control his aggressive impulses; for as he becomes more open to all of his impulses, his need to be liked by others and his tendency to give affection will be as strong as his impulses to strike out or to seize for himself. He will be aggressive in situations in which aggressiveness is realistically appropriate, but there will be no runaway need for aggression. His total behavior, in these and other areas, as he moves towards being open to all his experiences, will be more balanced and realistic, behavior which is appropriate to the survival and enhancement of a highly social animal.[11]

In other terminology, one could say that the core positive nature of the human organism is based, ultimately, on social interest, and the enhancement of the individual leads to a fully socialized, affiliative human being.

Rogers elaborates on this point.[12] He finds that fully functioning individuals are those best suited to carry on the evolutionary process. They know themselves and in knowing themselves, know all men. In acting for their own enhancement, they act for the enhancement of all. Rogers supports this statement by describing those clients who have successfully completed therapy. Such persons are "highly effective in the ongoing process of human evolution. . . . The psychologically mature person as I have described him has, I believe, the qualities which would cause him to value those experiences which would make for the survival and enhancement of the human race. He would be a worthy participant and guide in the process of human evolution."[13] Therefore, the second point emphasizes the basically social nature of man, the joining of the interests of one and of all, in the full self-knowledge of the individual.

The third point to be elaborated follows from the above: the values sought and acted upon by fully functioning individuals appear to be universal. In plumbing the depths of himself, the universal depths of mankind are understood. Rogers

has concluded: "that a new kind of emergent universality of value directions becomes possible when individuals move in the direction of psychological maturity, or more accurately, move in the direction of becoming open to their experiencing. Such a value base appears to make for the enhancement of self and others, and to promote a positive evolutionary process."[14] Further, according to Rogers, the values which emerge from the process of becoming open, aware, and trusting of self are held in common with others around the world who are becoming more fully functioning.

> This commonality does not seem to be due to the influences of any one culture, for I have found evidence of these directions in cultures as divergent as those of the United States, Holland, France, and Japan. I like to think that this commonality of value directions is due to the fact that we all belong to the same species—that just as a human infant tends, individually, to select a diet similar to that selected by other human infants, so a client in therapy tends, individually, to choose value directions similar to those chosen by other clients. As a species there may be certain elements of experience which tend to make for inner development and which would be chosen by all individuals if they were genuinely free to choose.[15]

Rogers states that this "possibility of universal human values directions" may lead to "organized, adaptive and social approaches to the perplexing value issues which face all of us."[16]

Similarity to Kohlberg and Adler

The similarity with Adler and Kohlberg on the last two points is striking. Although only Adler and Rogers perceive the valuing process as holistic and thus based on healthy personality functioning, all three theorists see the socialized and universal nature of the moral choices of the most fully developed individuals. Further, these moral choices appear to develop from the same process of enlarging one's sphere of social identification. In Kohlberg's postconventional stages one identifies finally with all mankind and realizes that how one acts toward another is, in fact, an act toward oneself. This leads one to choose values which enhance all human life. In Adler's system, a developed social interest also leads to identification and empathy with all mankind; value choices proceed from the view that what benefits one benefits all. And in Rogers's theoretical framework, as one explores one's own depth, one comes closer to the universal nature of man, and one's choices are based on this holistic perception of universality. Thus, again, one values those acts and feelings which enhance all of mankind.

For all three of these writers, it appears, the goal is the same. Only the process of attaining this goal reveals those differences which derive from the particularities of each theory.

To return to Rogers, he himself has presented a summary of his view which includes the holistic, socialized, and universal nature of the values of fully functioning individuals:

1. There is an organismic base for an organized valuing process within the human individual.
2. This valuing process in the human being is effective in achieving self-enhancement to the degree that the individual is open to the experiencing which is going on within himself.
3. One way of assisting the individual to move toward openness to experience is through a relationship in which he is prized as a separate person, in which the experiencing going on within him is empathically understood and valued, and in which he is given the freedom to experience his own feelings and those of others without being threatened in doing so.
4. In persons who are moving toward greater openness to their experiencing, there is an organismic commonality of value directions.
5. These common value directions are of such kinds as to enhance the development of the individual himself, of others in his community, and to make for the survival and evolution of his species.[17]

EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Teaching as the Facilitation of Learning

Rogers has introduced the term "facilitate" as a substitute for teaching or counseling in order to indicate his own approach to education, therapy, and growth. He speaks of the facilitation of change and learning. By this view, the only man who is educated is the man who has learned how to learn; the man who has learned how to adapt and change, who realizes that no knowledge is secure and that only the process of seeking knowledge gives any basis for security. Only from an interpersonal context in which learning is facilitated will arise "true students, real learners, creative scientists and scholars, and practitioners, the kind of individuals who can live in a delicate but ever changing balance between what is presently known and the flowing, moving, changing problems and facts of the future."[18]

In an address to educators at Harvard University, an address which he himself reports to have been received with furious criticism, Rogers made such confessions as: (1) "My experience has been that I cannot teach another person to teach," (2) furthermore, "I have come to feel that the outcomes of teaching are either unimportant or hurtful," (3) "I realize that I have lost interest in being a teacher," and (4) "I realize that I am only interested in being a learner."[19]

These statements are consistent with Rogers's holistic view of human developmental processes. For instance, as soon as focus is given to the activity of teaching, the question arises, what shall be taught? What, from the "superior" vantage point of the teacher, does the student need to know? Can a teacher really be sure of his answer to such a question? Or, what shall the course cover? Any answer given to this question presupposes that what is taught is what is learned; what is presented is what is assimilated. Furthermore, this assumption is usually followed by another: what is assimilated can be accurately measured by some means,

such as examination. But all such assumptions run counter to that view of man which postulates individual freedom and uniqueness. And they all become either harmful or useless in the face of the view which postulates the inherent strivings of the organism for maintenance and enhancement. The implication is, of course, that our present system lacks trust in the human organism; it denies man both his freedom and his dignity.

The facilitation of learning is not equivalent to teaching as commonly defined. It does not necessarily, for instance, rely upon any particular skills of the leader, nor upon his scholarly knowledge, nor upon his curricular planning, nor upon the use of audiovisual aids. It does not depend upon programed learning, lectures, oral reports, or even books and pencils and paper. Any of these, of course, might be utilized as a resource. In fact, a facilitator of learning is primarily just that in relationship to the learner, a resource. But as a living resource the facilitator can only function in an interpersonal relationship with the learner. It is this relationship which must, therefore, be of prime importance in any educational setting. In fact, Rogers maintains that in any professional work involving relationships with people, "whether as a psychotherapist, teacher, religious worker, guidance counselor, social worker, clinical psychologist, it is the quality of the interpersonal encounter with the client which is the most significant element in determining effectiveness."[20]

The kind of learning being facilitated within this interpersonal relationship will be self-initiated. Rogers considers learning to have been facilitated when the student participates responsibly in the learning process.[21] Self-initiated learning involves the whole person of the learner (feelings as well as intellect) and is the most lasting and pervasive. Furthermore, learning to be a learner, that is, to be independent, creative, and self-reliant is better facilitated when self-criticism and self-evaluation are basic and evaluation by others is of secondary importance.[22] This is, of course, learning the process of learning. It is being continually open to experience and incorporation into oneself of the very process of change.

Student-Centered Classrooms

Rogers, then, would have the classroom atmosphere or organization "student-centered."[23] This is, of course, learning by doing. Students become self-directed researchers, scientists themselves, on a less complex level. They seek answers to real questions, experiencing in themselves the pains and joys of inquiry. They may not learn as many "facts," but they learn the process by which facts become and unbecome, are accepted as such and later rejected. They learn how to learn.

Inquiry learning as promoted by Rogers, Bruner, and others does not necessarily go beyond or differ from that which Dreikurs and Kohlberg also promote. But the way in which Rogers would facilitate inquiring into moral and ethical issues does differ. As a facilitator of learning, Rogers would have the teacher provide an atmosphere which permits "the student, at any level, to be in real

contact with the relevant problems of his existence, so that he perceives problems and issues which he wishes to resolve."[24] Rogers does not hestitate to recommend to educators his own favorite device for genuine and meaningful learning—the basic encounter group.

Intensive Group Experience: Specific Technique for Moral Education

Since the early 1960s Rogers has written and spoken extensively on what has become one of the most widespread and practical contributions of humanistic psychology: the encounter group (known also by other names such as the "T" group, laboratory training, sensitivity training, and workshop). Regardless of the name used, the general aim of the intensive group experience has been to improve and facilitate self-learning and interpersonal communication. It has also been referred to as "a journey to the center of the self."[25] Rogers views the encounter group as a tool with tremendous potential for educational change. And actually, he and others have hailed it as having an even wider potential, that is, as constituting a genuine solution to the problem of alienation in our increasingly complex and materialistic society.[26]

An encounter group usually consists of 10 to 15 people, along with a facilitator or group leader. The group is relatively unstructured and characterized by a climate of freedom for the expression of personal feelings and interpersonal communication. The word "encounter" refers to that interaction which occurs when people drop their defenses and facades and relate directly and openly as "real" persons. The atmosphere thus created is like that found in client-centered therapy. The trust that is generated enables a person to recognize, experiment, and exchange self-defeating attitudes for those more conducive to innovative and constructive behavior.

By his own admission, Rogers's view of the "basic encounter group," as he refers to it, "represents only a part of the vast spectrum of special theories, practices, devices, exercises, and emphasis which characterize the group movement today."[27] His many writings about groups reflect his preference to relate his personal learnings based on his own involvement in groups as compared to reporting on any particular experimental research. For instance, he writes,

> Time and time again, I have seen individuals choose a whole new direction for their lives —philosophically, vocationally, and intellectually—as a result of an encounter group experience. . . . I have seen teachers who have transformed their classrooms, following an encounter experience, into a personal, caring, trusting, learning group, where students participate fully and openly in forming the curriculum and all the other aspects of their education. Tough business executives who described a particular business relationship as hopeless, have gone home and changed it into a constructive one. Students in a seminary where love and brotherhood were verbal ideals—contrasting sharply with the reality of almost complete and lonely alienation—have made tremendous strides toward real communication and caring for one another.[28]

And finally, the following, which is related in the often-reprinted chapter or article entitled, "The Process of the Encounter Group," illustrates an individual achieving that insight which, it has been argued, underlies those ethical principles characterized as being "universal and self-derived".[29] "A man tells, through his tears, of the tragic loss of his child, a grief which he is experiencing *fully* for the first time, not holding back his feelings in any way. Another says to him, also with tears in his eyes, 'I've never before felt a real physical hurt in me from the pain of another. I feel completely with you.' "[30]

Such personal experiences as these have led Rogers to "a gut-level conviction that profound personal and behavioral change can and does occur in and following an encounter group experience."[31] In words which are near to describing Kohlberg's postconventional level of moral development, Rogers maintains that "encounter groups lead to more personal independence, fewer hidden feelings, more willingness to innovate, and more opposition to institutional rigidities."[32] In other words, suited to our purposes, encounter groups provide a non-threatening atmosphere, in which participants can learn to more fully trust themselves. This trust then provides a worthy organismic base for moral growth and development.

Personal Relevancy of Approach

Rogers's approach is the most personally relevant of those considered here. His theoretical base states that only those experiences (or that information) which are personally relevant will be fully assimilated by the learner. His trust in the positive nature of the organism is such that no external structure is needed in order to grow. What is needed is a non-threatening environment in which the person can fully explore his own awarenesses and come closer to the positive, constructive center of his organism. Therefore, Rogers prefers to create an environment in which such exploration can take place, rather than provide any structure through guidelines or content. The discussion content comes solely from the personal experiences of the participants and is thus highly relevant.

Summary and Further Comparison to Kohlberg and Adler

The theories of Kohlberg, Adler and Dreikurs, and Rogers all present a view of the fully functioning individual which entails the development of a universal system of ethics. Kohlberg's view is primarily cognitive and has developed from empirical studies. Adler and Rogers developed their theories based on a holistic view of man coming out of their clinical observations. However, all views tend to see the most evolved person as experiencing an identification with all human life, maintaining a high level of social interest, and acting in accord with self-derived values which are considered to be universal. Ultimately, all theorists see the ends of moral growth in a similar fashion.

Their approaches to the processes of such moral growth, however, differ on several points. Kohlberg is concerned solely with cognition and sees growth

occurring as conflicting situations are debated and resolved. Adler and Dreikurs hold that a basis in mental health is a prerequisite for moral growth and see the most relevant situations for any child as occurring, first, within his family and, second, within the school. They provide guidance to participants through analyzing their own interpersonal lives along the lines of Adler's theory of individual psychology. Dreikurs argues that such guidance is necessary, since a person cannot fully know himself and needs others to clarify his perceptions. Rogers, as does Adler, views mental health as a prerequisite, but argues against the imposition of such structure as Dreikurs would provide. Rogers instead trusts in the person himself to make the most sense of his own situation and to have the choice of deciding which situation is the best starting place. He concentrates on providing the interpersonal climate in which the person can make this personal exploration.

CHAPTER 7

The Behavioral Approach

The behaviorists have supplied a wealth of research which bears on the problems of attaining self-control, resisting temptation, and showing concern for others. Their research illustrates the effect of the environment, particularly the interpersonal environment, in shaping individual behavior. In studying how children actually learn conventional moral behavior, this approach points to two primary sources: the influence of modeling and the consequences of direct reinforcement.

This approach is very important in moral education, since it specifies the ways in which we learn the values of our society. These values are those included under Kohlberg's Stages 3 and 4 of conventional moral thought, and are also the same as Rogers's introjected values. Since most of our young people do not move beyond this level, it is vital that we better understand how such traditional societal values are learned. In this area, behaviorists have made the most notable contributions.

MODELING

Both children and adults respond to the models other people represent to them by imitating their behavior and adopting it as their own. If the models display deviant behavior, more deviance will be found in the observers; if the models display aggressive behavior, more aggression is displayed by the observers; further, if the model's verbal statements and behavior conflict, the observer will more likely copy the behavior. This latter shows that the old adage, "Do as I say, not as I do," however, hopefully intended, actually runs counter to most behavior. We tend to do as others do, not as they say. In this fact rests the importance of being ourselves what we wish others to be and recognizing also that in our behavior we reflect the behavior of others around us. Below are the four main findings in the research on modeling and moral behavior.

The Importance of a Model

The importance of a model is demonstrated in many instances. An example involving the learning of deviant behavior is an experiment performed by S. Ross. The subjects were nursery-school children who alternated as customer and storekeeper in a toy-store situation. For some children a peer model was instructed to tell the children that on completion of the game they could take a single piece of candy, whereupon the peer model took three pieces. Other children were

confronted with a peer model who repeated the instructions to take one piece of candy and himself took only one. After the peer-model left the room, the children were observed to see how many pieces of candy they took. In general, the children confronted with the deviant peer-model more often took more pieces of candy than did the children confronted with the consistent peer-model. Moreover, the children in the deviant-model situation demonstrated more self-remonstration, more evidences of conflict, and sometimes tried to conceal the act.[1]

This is similar to the findings by Rosenhan in a non-laboratory situation. In a study of partially committed and fully committed civil rights workers, Rosenhan found that the more fully committed workers had a model for their concern for others in the altruism of the most dominant parent-figure in their early lives. On the other hand, the partially committed were socialized by parents who often demonstrated inconsistent behavior, usually strongly advocating moral and altruistic behavior but not always practicing it themselves. Therefore, the consistently altruistic model was missing and these young people's commitment to altruistic causes was only partially realized. In addition, just as the deviant children in the toy-store situation talked at greater length about their behavior, so the partially committed workers occupied more of the interviewers' time with philosophical justifications of their behavior.[2]

Although these two cases are not exactly parallel, their juxtaposition reveals that situations created in a laboratory setting are illustrative of situations that exist in the more complex world outside the laboratory.

Importance of the Status of the Model

In addition to the mere presence of a model, the model's behavior is more readily adopted by the observer, if the model appears to be successful, prestigious, or in other ways of high status. One study found that pedestrians tended to cross against the light more often, if they were previously exposed to a model who had been instructed to do so, and, in addition, more violations were recorded if the model was attired as a high-status individual.[3]

The possible implications of this study are far-reaching. In our society we give high status to movie stars, television personalities, news broadcasters, and public officials. Any of these individuals through the nationwide media may become a model for those who are watching. This has been demonstrated, for instance, in studies of the effects of soap operas on American housewives.[4] There is even a daytime talk show entitled "Take My Advice," in which TV and screen personalities give advice on serious matters of marriage and morals to those who write letters asking for such advice. Thus the lifestyles, fictional and nonfictional, of television personalities, as well as the widely publicized behavior of our political leaders, have an impact, however indirect, in shaping the behavior of our young people.

On a more immediate level, persons who have been recognized as authorities by established government, such as teachers, law enforcement personnel, and

members of the health profession, also provide models for those with whom they come in contact. The most direct application, however, lies within the family. Those parents who are most admired and respected by their children and those who are seen as most powerful will be accepted as models by their children. Although all parents serve as models to their young, those who are loved and/or those who are powerful will be accepted as models more fully and with less conflict.

Importance of the Consequences to a Model

Children who have observed a model being punished or rewarded for a particular piece of behavior will more readily adopt the rewarded behavior than that which received punishment. In studies of aggression, children were exposed to aggressive models. In general, the children tended to demonstrate more aggressive behavior when in a frustrating situation following such exposure than did a group of control children who had not been exposed to an aggressive model. However, when the children were divided into two groups, one observing the aggressive behavior and an immediate reward for that behavior, and the other observing such behavior receiving punishment, the group which saw the aggression rewarded tended themselves to exhibit more aggression than those who saw it punished. Thus, the consequences to the model can promote or inhibit the adoption of the observed behavior.

Again, the implications of such studies extend far outside the laboratory. Children will model parents who exhibit lawbreaking behavior and get away with it. Particularly is this true, if this behavior is then reinforced by jokes and approval from the parents' peer group. Even behavior among one's peer group is affected in a similar fashion, such as aggressive pushing and shoving among school children which may appear to be punished by teachers and parents. If the peer group rewards such behavior by elevating the most aggressive children to positions of esteem within the group, then the behavior is often more strongly rewarded than punished and will thereby be copied by other children against the injunctions of adults. The system of rewards and punishments outside the laboratory is complex and what appears to be punishment may be canceled out by other aspects of the environment which reward the behavior. It is rare that the simplicity of the laboratory situation is found in the outside world.

Importance of the Model's Pattern of Self-Reinforcement

The ability to appropriately reinforce or inhibit one's own behavior in the absence of immediate external consequences is most important in learning self-control. In one particular study, children watched one of two adults in a bowling game. One adult model helped himself to candy from a nearby dish each time that he had scored 20 points. In the other situation the adult helped himself to candy each time he had scored 10 points, a relatively easy goal. The children who watched these adults were then left to bowl by themselves and their patterns of

self-reinforcement were observed. It was found that the patterns of reinforcement demonstrated by the children strongly matched those of the model to whom they had been exposed. For example, those who had watched the model who took some candy each time he scored 10 points reinforced themselves very generously, whereas those children who had been exposed to the other model did not. In addition, the children tended to reproduce the remarks that the model made while bowling, whether self-critical or self-approving.[5]

This study suggests that children are influenced by the standard-setting and self-reinforcement patterns exhibited by adults with whom they are in contact. They can learn this behavior, as they can other behavior which they observe, without any direct reinforcement to themselves. In fact, they can learn to absorb whole patterns of behavior from those adults serving as models to them without such behavior being directly taught, rehearsed, or directly reinforced in any way.

REINFORCEMENT

The concept of reinforcement is one of the major tenets of behaviorism. Positive reinforcement refers to reward following upon the performance of certain behavior. Negative reinforcement, contrary to popular thinking, refers to a punishment or non-rewarding response being withdrawn or withheld after the performance of certain behavior. Finally, punishment itself, commonly confused with negative reinforcement, refers to a non-pleasure-producing response or a painful response consequent to some act of behavior.

In much of behavioral research reinforcement has been the most dominant technique utilized. Rats learn to run their mazes to avoid shocks and receive their pellets of corn. B. F. Skinner's pigeons learned to play Ping-Pong in response to reinforcement procedures. Students have learned to read and write and manipulate numbers on programed learning machines when right answers were rewarded by appropriate buzzes and flashing lights. Often, students achieve in school because grades offer positive reinforcement. Father, and perhaps mother, continues to work because of the reward of a monthly paycheck and/or because of reinforcement in terms of prestige, status, and power.

Identifying Reinforcers

It should be pointed out at this point that identifying reinforcers in the world outside of the laboratory is often a tricky business. Particular consequences may act as rewards for some persons and not for others. For example, some children do not regard grades as a reward and are not, therefore, motivated to achieve by the conventional school grading system. Such a tendency toward minority or atypical responding is illustrative of the complexity and diversity of reinforcement systems. Thus, any particular response that may be spontaneously observed, such as not responding to grades as rewards, may be assumed to rest on a foundation of emotionally ladened conditioning over a long period of time. In other words,

in complex situations, any particular and direct reinforcement of behavior often does not work. This is true for two reasons: either some other, but as yet unidentified, reinforcer may negate the reward in question, or a long history of conflicting conditioning may cause the reward to be discounted as such.

This appears to be the case also in regard to moral development. The development of self-control and the acceptance of societal norms rest on such a broad and complex foundation that direct and effective reinforcement is difficult to implement. A common example is illustrative. A child performs an aggressive action by hitting his classmate or destroying school property. For this he receives a disciplinary intervention in the form of punishment: his teacher, now angry, spanks him. This punishment has the effect of inhibiting aggressive behavior in the boy while in the presence of his teacher. However, it is questionable whether the model his teacher presents of an angry and aggressive individual is not more powerful in the long run than the immediate punishment. Indeed, research shows that children who are punished physically are often later more aggressive with their peers than other children.[6]

Nonetheless, there is supportive evidence of the effectiveness of direct reinforcement on moral development. For example, research seems to suggest, though not conclusively, that children who are socialized early, often with direct reinforcement, later show more self-control than other children. In addition, direct and immediate reinforcement of a given behavior is more effective than delayed reinforcement. In one experiment children were given a book to read which was written in a foreign language and contained no pictures. They were placed in a room in which attractive toys were available. Those children who were punished immediately upon leaving the book later tended to sit quietly and avoid the toys. Their behavior was in direct contrast to that of other children who had been punished several minutes after they had left their assigned chair and incomprehensible book. These children tended to reach for the toys more frequently despite possible disapproval.[7] Thus the inhibition of behavior is greater when punishment immediately follows forbidden acts.

MODELING AND REINFORCEMENT OF MORAL BEHAVIOR

In a series of experiments Bandura and McDonald alternated modeling and reinforcement procedures in order to change moral decisions of young children. Children who in a pretest tended to judge an intentional act with slight resulting damage as being worse than an accidental act with greater ensuing damage composed one group. Children who on a pretest judged an act good or bad according to the extent of the damage, regardless of intent, formed the second group. Each group was then presented with various situations designed to elicit the opposite of their original response.

In the first situation children watched a model give the response opposite to their own response on a pretest, observed the model being rewarded, and were

themselves rewarded after matching the model's response. In the second group, children observed the model and his consequent reward but were not rewarded themselves. In the third and last group the children did not observe a model but were reinforced only when they produced a response opposite to their original response. In all cases children presented with a model adopted the experimentally desired answer to a much greater extent than those only receiving reinforcement. Moreover, those who sustained their new responses at a higher level were those who had observed the model and then been reinforced for matching the model's behavior.

Therefore the combination of a consistent model and reinforcement for matching the model provided the greatest long-term change in behavior. Moreover, the group who observed the model but lacked reinforcement were a close second. Very disparate were the results of the group who were reinforced but had no model for change. Their answers in the last analysis were close to their original answers. In their case there was some, but not much, change in moral behavior.[8]

This experiment shows rather impressively, at least within the laboratory situation, the importance of providing adult models in order to encourage moral development in children. Moreover, the greatest consistency of moral behavior is probably attained when an adult model displays consistent behavior and reinforces young people who model his behavior.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CLASSROOM EDUCATION

The behaviorists have illustrated very well the need for acceptable models plus additional consistent reinforcement in training our young in socially acceptable behavior. However, when we leave the laboratory and move to the outside world, we must deal with complexities which notably interfere with the direct inculcation of moral behavior.

Inconsistency of Adult Models

The first problem occurs in the behavior of the adult models which we present to our young. Many adults are not consistent in aligning their own behavior with the verbal messages they give their children. Although most parents and educators believe in upholding the law and showing respect to others, their behavior often belies their speech. In one study it was found that of seventeen hundred middle-class Americans 99 percent confessed to offenses sufficiently serious to have drawn a sentence of at least one year in the state penitentiaries.[9] With impunity Americans break speed limits, pad expense accounts, and find ways to outwit corporations and other large institutions. Even Americans who preach tolerance for all persons will often turn around and justify discriminatory practices against those who are not like themselves and whose gain appears to interfere with their own self-interest. In some cases, of course, particularly in small legal infractions, action may be based on a code of higher principles, as in the case of

Thoreau (see Chapter 3) and thus can be justified within a consistent system. But more often than not, the behavior is simply inconsistent with the professed belief.

Therefore, our young people are often presented with verbal messages about morality and deviant behavior at the same time. As the toy-store experiment illustrates, young people given this choice will more often model the deviant behavior. Concerned parents and teachers, aware of the impact of modeling upon young people, must first look to their own behavior rather than that of the child.

Adult Resistance to New Conditioning

A second and related problem arises in providing appropriate models and reinforcement with the expectation of changing behavior when long-term factors are not considered. Adult behavior, for example, is less susceptible to change than is the behavior of children. This is so because the adult is bringing years of previously conditioned responses to the present situation and the strength of these responses is often unknown. Many times, previously learned behavior will override any new input from the environment unless that input is sustained and consistent over a long period of time.

One of the adult responses which appears to be deeply conditioned in Americans is obedience to authority. This is testified to by the Milgram experiment, in which 70 percent of the subjects involved delivered supposedly lethal shocks to a confederate of the experimenter because they had been ordered to do so. Individuals in post-World War II America, contrary to popular belief, have strongly engrained patterns leading them to obey authorities regardless of the damage to individual rights. Such behavior is not easily changed simply by providing more humanistic models.

Rosenhan did an experiment in which he chose to change the behavior of those subjects administering the shocks. Prior to each subject having the opportunity to administer shocks, the subject watched a model perform the experiment. In one case the model was humane and refused to continue the experiment, since it was apparent the person being shocked was hurt. In a second instance, the model questioned and destroyed the legitimacy of the experimenter as an authority and also discontinued applying shocks. In the third case, the model obediently followed the experimenter, and in the last case, no model was presented. Results showed that in the case of an obedient model and no model at all, 85 percent of the subjects continued to apply shocks until the lethal level was reached. In the cases of the humane and delegitimizing model, however, over 50 percent of the subjects continued to apply supposedly fatal shocks. Although this is significantly less than in the first two cases, it still represents a majority and thereby constitutes an appalling testimony to the lack of respect for individual life among Americans, despite verbiage to the contrary.[10]

Rosenhan comments that the results were unexpectedly weak and that his subjects were particularly resistant to new conditioning. This is the case among most adolescent and older individuals. The impact of early conditioning, which

includes the engrained response of obedience to authority, may do much to counter behavioral changes produced by modeling in individuals beyond childhood.

Therefore, problems in behavioral conditioning of moral patterns may arise due to the inconsistent behavior presented by many adult models and the resistance of these models themselves to that same conditioning process. A third and final problem also exists. With this problem we come full circle to the shortcomings of this school of thought.

Lack of Philosophical Grounding

The problem arises in that moral development is defined by the behavioristic school as learning socially acceptable responses and inhibiting socially inappropriate responses. This means that the behavior to be learned is taken directly from the cultural norms of the environment in which the individual lives.

The behaviorists do not question these norms nor suggest, as do Kohlberg, Rogers, and Adler, that there may be principles upon which men act, which in fact, transcend the limits of any particular culture. Therefore, the behavioristic school leaves the scene at the point where more philosophically grounded schools of thought enter. There is no question in the behavioristic literature that man can or should move beyond the norms of his society.

In the simplicity of the laboratory, generally only two alternatives are offered to the subject and such alternatives are preselected for experimental convenience in order to discover *how* one makes a choice. There is no particular moral reason inherent in the choice of these alternatives. In fact, the choice of offered alternatives is not discussed, nor investigated by the behaviorists. However, in the world outside the laboratory there are numerous unselected alternatives from which to choose. Models are available which have the capacity of evoking many varied and often conflicting responses, whether through personal association or through the impact of the media.

Furthermore, if one is in the position of the shaper of the behavior, as is supposedly the case with educators, how is one to choose which behaviors to reinforce or model? The behaviorists offer no answers, since they have concentrated on how one teaches moral behavior and not on how one defines it. Without a definition of moral behavior which transcends the immediate environment, there is no escape from the dilemma posed by the existence of so many models and alternative choices available in any given situation. Although the behaviorists have shown how to teach moral behavior, they cannot tell us what it is. This fact leaves their theory without anchorage in a complex and inconsistent world.

PART III

PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS IN THE CLASSROOM

CHAPTER 8

Values Clarification

Because of the complexity of the world in which we live, young people today are provided with the opportunity, or perhaps confronted with the difficulty, of making more choices than ever before. Moreover, young people today are less provincial and more sophisticated than in the past. They continually question the immediate context of their lives: should my life be spent seeking an accumulation of material goods? how should I react to people who have authority over me? what is the relationship between love and sex and can I have one without the other? what are the reasons why I should get more education? In addition, they are faced with a vast array of questions involving national and universal political, social, and economic issues.

EMPHASIS ON THE VALUING PROCESS

In order to give young people and the teachers who guide them practical guidelines for sorting out and evaluating the complexities of these issues, Louis Raths, Sidney Simon, and their colleagues have developed an educational approach called Values Clarification. This approach focuses not on the content of values, as in the old "Bag of Virtues" approach, but on the *process* of valuing. This approach seeks to help young people clarify already-formed beliefs and those which are still emerging.

With this approach they go far in fulfilling the legacy of John Dewey, who insisted that we not teach morals alone but "aim at making methods of learning, of acquiring intellectual power, and of assimilating subject-matter, such that they will render behavior more enlightened, more consistent, more vigorous than it otherwise would be."[1]

Seven Steps in Valuing

In order to fulfill this legacy, Raths originally developed seven steps in the process of valuing, subsumed under three categories. These steps are presented here as rephrased by Harmin and Simon:

Choosing

1. Seeking alternatives when faced with a choice.
2. Looking ahead to probable consequences before choosing.
3. Making choices on one's own, without depending on others.

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Prizing

4. Being aware of one's own preferences and valuations.
5. Being willing to affirm one's choices publicly.

Acting

6. Acting in ways that are consistent with choices and preferences.
7. Acting in those ways repeatedly with a pattern to one's life.[2]

In order to facilitate the student in moving through these steps, Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum have devised numerous exercises applicable to the classroom, which draw both on the student's own personal experience and occasionally on outside information. Such exercises generally take up a small portion of classroom time. Some of the exercises are designed to be sequential and others are complete in themselves. These exercises are for the most part presented in their joint book *Values Clarification.*

As students are encouraged to think their way through the above seven steps, they become increasingly aware of the valuing process; they are not, however, encouraged to adopt any necessary or particular set of beliefs. Rather, students are urged to become aware of their own values and beliefs, to strengthen them by examining their consistency, and to more vigorously align them with their actual behavior.

SIMILARITY TO THE HUMANISTIC THEORIES

In addition to drawing on the tradition of Dewey, much of the values clarification approach reflects the theoretical orientations of the other contemporary approaches already discussed. Aspects of each of these orientations are compared below with the values clarification approach, followed by illustrative classroom exercises. However, perhaps it should first be pointed out that these exercises are here necessarily incomplete. We have quoted from the original source just enough to illustrate the point in question. The reader is advised to do more homework on the subject if actual classroom utilization becomes his goal. An annotated bibliography is provided for this purpose.

Self-Awareness and an Inner Locus of Evaluation

In accord with the theoretical orientation of Carl Rogers, the values clarification approach aids the student in getting in touch with his own beliefs. In true Rogerian fashion, the student asks: what is it I am aware of in myself? or more prosaically, how do I feel about this? These are the same questions Rogers's clients learned to ask in searching out and developing their own organismic values. In addition, the student is asked to examine whether or not he has chosen his values freely, or in Rogerian terminology, whether these values are introjected or organismic. Has the student fully evaluated his own position or has he merely adopted the position of others? The student in learning what it is he prizes and

cherishes begins to develop an inner locus of evaluation and to claim emerging values as being his own.

An example of a classroom exercise which facilitates becoming aware of one's own values is the following. The originators of the exercise suggest that it be followed by group discussion. The following is a list of 17 traits. The student ranks each item according to the importance of the characteristic for him.

__Ambitious (hard-working, aspiring)
__Broadminded (open-minded)
__Capable (competent, effective)
__Cheerful (lighthearted, joyful)
__Clean (neat, tidy)
__Courageous (standing up for beliefs)
__Forgiving (willing to pardon others)
__Helpful (working for the welfare of others)
__Honest (sincere, truthful)
__Imaginative (daring, creative)
__Independent (self-reliant, self-sufficient)
__Intellectual (intelligent, reflective)
__Logical (consistent, rational)
__Loving (affectionate, tender)
__Obedient (dutiful, respectful)
__Polite (courteous, well-mannered)
__Self-Controlled (restrained, self-disciplined)[3]

Cognitive Analysis of Alternatives and Consequences

The values clarification approach also incorporates many of the methods used by Kohlberg. The student is urged to rationally assess alternative choices and examine their consequences in much the same kind of group discussion as used with the moral dilemmas devised by Kohlberg. Yet the values clarification approach incorporates the additional strength of usually basing such discussion on the student's own experience, rather than on that of fictional characters presented by Kohlberg.

An example of a values clarification exercise, highly reminiscent of Kohlberg's work, is provided below. Students are first asked to discuss things which they have done which later they have regretted. Then they are presented with one of several possible vignettes, one of which is the following:

> You are on a vacation trip and are driving to the beach with your parents. You would like to go to the amusement park, but you are concerned because you have spent most of the money you had saved for your vacation earlier. Your father stops for gasoline and you get out and walk around. A lady is walking back to her car and you see her purse fall open and her wallet fall out. You walk over, pick up the wallet just as the lady gets into her car to drive away. The edges of several ten dollar bills are sticking out of the wallet. No one saw you pick it up. What would you do?[4]

After deciding on their answers, students are encouraged to discuss their solution together in the groups and discover whether or not agreement exists among group members. It is also suggested that the teacher use role playing as a technique to foster student involvement.

This exercise can then be followed by one which examines the consequences of each of the alternatives suggested by the group discussion. This is called making a *consequences grid.*

CONSEQUENCES GRID[5]

alternative No. 1:	alternative No. 2:	alternative No. 3:

Students are encouraged to list as many consequences as possible for each of the three best alternatives. They are then given the opportunity of reevaluating their positions.

Empathy and the Development of Social Interest

The processes of valuing produce many of the same results as those advocated by the team of Adler and Dreikurs. Many of the specific exercises facilitate the development of empathy and social interest. For instance, the consequences grid could also be used to discover the logical consequences inherent in specific and real interpersonal situations at school and at home. In this manner, students really begin to discover just what their actions mean in the social world of which they are a part. They learn to really hear each other and to speak honestly of their own feelings and beliefs.

Certain exercises require cooperation in a simulated crisis. To achieve such cooperation students must balance their own self-interest against the larger interest of the group. In such a way, as in the approach of Dreikurs, students are assisted in developing that empathy which Adler and others have considered a prerequisite for the realization of social interest and ethical behavior. In the "Fall-Out Shelter Problem" a crisis situation is posed which forces students to think about the total group and which requires that they consider the situation from viewpoints other than their own. The class is divided into groups of seven or eight who sit together. The teacher presents the situation to the groups:

> Your group are members of a department in Washington, D.C., that is in charge of experimental stations in the far outposts of civilization. Suddenly the Third World War breaks out and bombs begin dropping. Places all across the globe are being destroyed. People are heading for whatever fallout shelters are available. You receive a desperate call from one of your experimental stations, asking for help.
>
> It seems there are *ten* people but there is only enough space, air, food, and water in their fall-out shelter for *six* people for a period of *three* months—which is how long they estimate they can safely stay down there. They realize that if they have to decide among themselves which six should go into the shelter, they are likely to become irrational and begin fighting. So they have decided to call your department, their superiors, and leave the decision to you. They will abide by your decision.

But each of you has to quickly get ready to head down to your own fallout shelter. So all you have time for is to get superficial descriptions of the ten people. You have half an hour to make your decision. Then you will have to go to your own shelter.

So, as a group you now have a half hour to decide which four of the ten will have to be eliminated from the shelter. Before you begin, I want to impress upon you two important considerations. It is entirely possible that the six people you choose to stay in the shelter might be the only six people left to start the human race over again. This choice is, therefore, very important. Do not allow yourself to be swayed by pressure from the others in your group. Try to make the best choices possible. On the other hand, if you do not make a choice in a half hour, then you are, in fact, choosing to let the ten people fight it out among themselves, with the possibility that more than four might perish. You have *exactly* one-half hour. Here is all you know about the ten people:

1. Bookkeeper; 31 years old
2. His wife; six months pregnant
3. Black militant; second-year medical student
4. Famous historian-author; 42 years old
5. Hollywood starlette; singer; dancer
6. Biochemist
7. Rabbi; 54 years old
8. Olympic athlete
9. College co-ed
10. Policeman with gun (they cannot be separated)[6]

Values clarification is, therefore, in many respects a practical educational application of humanistic theories of moral development. In the values clarification exercises, as in humanistic theory, the locus of evaluation is centered in the self and not in the external world. The approach also implies a basic trust in the ability of man to make thoughtful decisions which are clear and consistent and which lead to fuller functioning, both for the individual and the society in which he lives. Finally, there is general agreement by both Simon and Kohlberg that the values clarification approach does facilitate progress through the moral stages identified by Kohlberg.[7] And by implication it also leads towards the ethical, fully functioning human being described by Rogers and Adler.

THEORETICAL DIFFICULTIES WITH THE VALUES CLARIFICATION APPROACH

Despite apparent success in classroom situations and despite a general compatibility with humanistic and developmental theory, the values clarification approach has to date failed to develop its own philosophical foundations and its own clearly formulated objectives. Some of the ambiguities arising from these failings are discussed below.

Origin of Values

First, the proponents of values clarification never precisely define values nor state what is the origin of the values we hold. The student is led through a

procedure to clarify his values, with the assumption implicit that he already holds them. If he does indeed hold previously acquired values, we can draw upon other theories to speculate on their origin: such values may be external in origin, such as the introjected values of Rogers, the conventional values of Kohlberg, and the values which reflect models in one's environment as suggested by the behaviorists; or such values may be internal in origin, as are Rogers's organismic values and the postconventional morality of Kohlberg.

This immediately leads to another problem. If values may be externally or internally derived, with which set of values are the values clarification people concerned? By implication they are primarily concerned with internal values that rely on an inner locus of evaluation and not with external values introjected from the environment. Evidence from the clinical setting, however, shows that it is a long and difficult therapeutic process to learn to distinguish our own values from those which we have taken from others about us. Such clinical evidence points to the fact that for the most part *we do not know what we want* and that discovering what it is that we want, what indeed it is that we most value, is in itself an accomplishment of no small dimensions. Therefore, the separation by an individual of organismic and introjected values is a lifelong task, although progress in this task can be noted all along the way.

It is apparent that those arguing for values clarification generally do not recognize such difficulties. Not only do they fail to specify the origin of values, or the values which are particularly "valuable" in their eyes, but they also fail to recognize the difficulties in really learning what it is we "prize and cherish" as individuals.

Rogers and Adler and other psychotherapists are well aware of the difficulties in determining what are the more important values which guide our lives. Moreover, their experience shows that the discovery or creation of such values requires an openness to experience on an emotional level which cannot be approached by mere cognitive skill. This point is also recognized by Kirschenbaum, one of the original proponents of values clarification, when he reflects on the shortcomings of this technique. He agrees that in order to truly ascertain one's own cherished beliefs, there is a need to return to the feeling level. And he agrees on the need of applications drawn from psychotherapy, sensitivity training, gestalt therapy, and bioenergetics. These approaches all focus on discovering and expressing one's feelings in the present moment. Yet he also maintains that this need goes beyond the limitations of most classroom situations.[5]

The first problem, then, with the values clarification approach is the lack of clarification around what exactly defines the concept of values and the lack of distinction between externally and internally derived values. Such a distinction leads to the further difficulty that internally derived values are not easily distinguished from external values. Moreover, the clarification of internally derived values, if such is to be sought, often requires an approach which opens up the

deeper levels of emotional being and perhaps, thereby, requires a setting quite different from that of the classroom as it is ordinarily conceived.

Free Choice

The second difficulty is in some ways part and parcel of the first. The proponents of the values clarification approach state that after examining alternatives the student will freely choose among them. There are centuries of philosophical debate behind the use of the word "free," and current psychological theories continue to debate whether or not we ever freely choose. Even if we do have the option of freely choosing, as the humanistic theorists contend, freely choosing is certainly not an easy process. How does one define a value that is freely chosen? To what extent can that value reflect the values of models in one's environment, particularly one's parents or a public school authority figure such as a teacher? If an individual's particular value is reflective of the environment in which he was reared, can this value be said to have been "freely chosen"? Isn't it more likely that this value results from a mere introjection of the values of those about him? Again, we run up against questions posed by the differences between external and internal values and the lack of distinction between them as made by those who devised the value clarifications format. Evidence from elsewhere implies that it takes many years of self-exploration in order to know what is ours and what we have borrowed from others. Moreover, what is borrowed from others is most likely not freely chosen. In the values clarification approach these ramifications of valuing and choosing are ignored.

Ability to Consider Alternatives

Whereas the first two problems present questions relevant to the emotional complexities of man, the third poses a question concerned with cognition. In the procedures of the values clarification approach, students are to outline alternatives and consider consequences as an important part of the strategy. Certainly in proposing such guidelines, consideration needs to be made of the work in the field of cognitive development, which states that full consideration of alternatives, and hence of consequences, cannot begin until the appropriate or corresponding stage of development is attained. Kohlberg stressed this in the theoretical development of his own theory, yet the values clarification proponents appear to have given it little consideration. The point is less crucial than the first two, since even small children can consider alternatives to some extent. Nevertheless, according to research in cognitive development, the scope and meaningfulness of moral alternatives comes only with age.

Affirming Beliefs

Values clarification advocates have been questioned concerning the necessity of affirming one's beliefs. Often one's beliefs pertain to personal matters which may have little relevance in the public domain. Or, as Kirschenbaum suggests,

the affirmation of one's beliefs may conflict with a higher value and thus be deemed inappropriate.[9] For example, there is little apparent gain in affirming one's political beliefs to an employer who believes otherwise, thereby possibly endangering one's position. On the other hand, political considerations may so intrude into one's job that standing up for one's personal beliefs and publicly affirming them is necessary to maintain one's own integrity. Affirmation becomes worth the risk of unemployment.

Obviously, there are many situational factors which surround the question of affirming one's beliefs. There is, for instance, the problem of opposition from others in so doing. Teachers wishing to utilize this approach may run the risk of head-on collisions with parents or even other teachers. Even a college professor told this writer recently that it presented a danger to society for students to be encouraged to examine their personal value systems. In recognition of this problem, Kirschenbaum suggests sharing, sometimes in privacy, as an alternative to affirming.

Acting on Beliefs

The lack of recognition of situational considerations brings to the fore a fifth question about this approach. Exactly what do the writers mean when they state that one should act "repetitively and with a pattern" on one's beliefs. This may indeed be desirable in situations which are stable and unchanging. However, in the complex, fast-moving world in which most of us live, situations vary rapidly and new factors may intrude which did not exist yesterday. Rogers and others have advocated more flexible responding to the environment, responding which permits continual reconsideration of relevant factors and which leads to appropriate and recognizable changes in behavior. Thus, repetition and patterning may result in a more rigid moral orientation, an orientation which is not conducive to full functioning in a complex world.

Lack of Objectives

Finally, Kohlberg himself criticizes Simon's approach for a lack of fully developed objectives. If one has clarified one's values, how does one know? What is the end result or what are markers along the way? Is the end result to guide one along the pathway to Rogerian fully functioning living or along the pathway to behavioristic adjustment to society? Again, one assumes the former but there are no clear indications from the leaders of this program.

To summarize, the values clarification program lacks philosophical foundations and well-defined objectives. The proponents of the program, moreover, have failed to recognize the many emotional, developmental, and cognitive components of the process of valuing which are well documented in other bodies of literature. The gist of the above criticisms is to point out that the process of valuing is a very complex process and arriving at one's own values is rarely an easy task.

EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

In spite of theoretical weaknesses, the values clarification approach to moral education has been widely used in the classroom and appears, according to reported individual accounts, to have been very successful. In part, it has been successful because the exercises are clearly directed at the student with suggestions made for applications at various age levels. In part, its success may be attributed to the very clear, stimulating, and well-designed exercises which challenge the student at the same time as they engage his interest. In part, the success of the approach may also be due to the fact that although the relationship is as yet unclarified, the approach is actually compatible with the thinking in other contemporary fields dealing with the facilitation of moral development.

The originators of the program have suggested numerous ways in which the program may be adapted to the classroom. Particular exercises may be used by themselves during a time slot set aside especially for values clarification. Or the values clarification approach may be integrated into the existing subject matter by introducing questions about values, along with questions about facts and concepts. Finally, the values clarification approach can be fully integrated with the subject matter in such a way that values and concepts and facts all interact with one another, allowing the content to be partially shaped and selected by student values and the values to be partially shaped by the content.

An example of the latter approach would suggest that a unit begin by a discussion of student values, drawing from the students statements about what is most important to them. In a history class, such statements might lead to a discussion of what constitutes legitimate authority or what constitutes the possible extent of individual freedom in a given society or a given school community. The unit, then, whether on the American Revolution or World War II or some other period, would be shaped in order to better examine these value questions. This is precisely what Dewey had in mind. Material would be presented and evaluated in light of these questions, rather than in chronological order. In concluding the unit, the students would then reevaluate their beliefs, perhaps reorder their priorities, and at least clarify those questions they are still unable to answer for themselves.

Whether such an approach is chosen or another one instead, the introduction of the valuing process into the classroom would increase the meaningfulness and relevancy of current school curricula and promote moral development among our children. In other words, if we are going to provide an education for our children which is free from indoctrination, experienced as personally relevant to their lives, and capable of producing a social mass of courageous, service-oriented citizens, then the hidden morality of the standard curriculum must be made visible. As educators we would then be realizing the legacy of John Dewey. Our young adults would emerge from their formal education more enlightened, more consistent, and more vigorous in their behavior and beliefs.

Notes

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10. Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum, pp. 291–92.

Suggestions for Further Reading

The following is not intended to be an extensive bibliography on moral development or moral education. That is, it is not designed for the advanced student who may want to do specific research. It is, rather, an introductory listing of those writings deemed appropriate for the beginning student. Annotations are provided for the reader's convenience in selection.

ANSBACHER, HEINZ L., and ANSBACHER, ROWENA R. *The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler: A Systematic Presentation in Selections from His Writings.* New York: Harper & Row, 1956. This book includes major writings of Adler and covers quite well the major concepts of Adlerian psychology. For the student who wants to read at an advanced, yet introductory level, this book is highly recommended. There are also chapters on the implications of Adlerian psychology for classroom teaching.

BANDURA, ALBERT, and WALTERS, RICHARD H. *Social Learning and Personality Development.* New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963. This book is suggested for the student who wants an in-depth understanding of the behavioristic approach as applied to social and moral behavior. The role of models and the specific ways in which environmental reinforcers may be manipulated in order to evoke desired responses are explained in detail. The authors report on a wealth of research to support their approach.

BRUNER, JEROME S. *The Process of Education.* New York: Random House, 1963. This book is the report of a conference of scientists and teachers, called together to discuss the improvement of science teaching in the schools. It is, in fact, a searching discussion of school education which proposes the adoption of the "inquiry method" as a basis for learning and teaching. Such a method is suggested by Rogers to be by nature facilitative. And it is very much in keeping with those methods advocated by John Dewey.

DEWEY, JOHN. *Moral Principles in Education.* Reprint of 1909 edition. Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1975. This book is recommended for the student who wants an increased understanding of just what moral education means in its broadest perspective to the educational establishment. This latest edition contains an excellent Preface by SIDNEY HOOK which should aid the student in grasping the significance of Dewey's views.

DREIKURS, RUDOLF. *Children the Challenge.* New York: Harper & Row, 1964. Parents and teachers may find this book helpful in applying Adlerian principles of child guidance to the home environment. Many useful examples of real-life situations are provided.

_____. *Psychology in the Classroom.* 2nd ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. This book applies the principles of Adlerian psychology to the everyday life of the classroom. Useful examples are provided of how teachers may structure their relationships with students according to these principles.

HALL, ROBERT T., and DAVIS, JOHN U. *Moral Education: In Theory and Practice.* Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1975. This book is highly recommended for the student who wants an in-depth, yet comprehensive, understanding of both the philosophical and the psychological aspects of human moral behavior from a contemporary perspective. These authors have raised and, where possible, answered, many of the more intricate questions involving theoretical and practical concerns. In addition, they have provided excellent suggestions for practical classroom application.

KOHLBERG, LAWRENCE, and TURIEL, ELLIOT. "Moral Development and Moral Education." In GERALD S. LESSER, ed., *Psychology and Educational Practice.* Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1971. Kohlberg's research has been reported in a number of sources. Any complete and recent text on educational psychology will no doubt contain either a section by Kohlberg himself or one which further describes his work. This one is particularly recommended, since Kohlberg goes into considerable detail as to the ramifications of this approach for contemporary educational settings.

MATSON, F. W., ed. *Without/Within: Behaviorism and Humanism.* Monterey, Calif.: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1973. This is an excellent collection of writings for the student who wants to increase his understanding of the differences and similarities between psychoanalysis, behaviorism, and humanism.

MILHOLLEN, F., and FORISHA, B. E. *From Skinner to Rogers: Contrasting Approaches to Education.* Lincoln, Nebr.: Professional Educators Publications, 1973. This book will introduce the student to the essential differences between these two prominent psychologists and the implications of their views for classroom teaching. The book also contains an annotated bibliography for use as a guide to more advanced sources on behaviorism and humanism.

ROGERS, CARL R. *Freedom to Learn.* Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1969. This book is based on the humanistic orientation of Rogers in psychology and particularly in client-centered therapy. The result is an advocation of student-centered education. Specific means are suggested by which teachers may risk themselves in experimentation with their classes. A conceptual basis is provided for such experimentation as well as a presentation of the personal and philosophical underpinnings and ramifications of the whole approach. And finally, a specific program for bringing about self-directed change in an entire educational system is also presented.

SIMON, S. B., HOWE, L. W., and KIRSCHENBAUM, HOWARD. *Values Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies for Teachers and Students.* New York: Hart Publishing Co., 1972. This book contains a wealth of exercises designed to implement a program of Values Clarification in the classroom.

SIMON, S. B., and KIRSCHENBAUM, HOWARD, eds. *Readings in Values Clarification.* Minneapolis, Minn.: Winston Press, 1973. This book is recommended for the student who wants to read widely from a number of authors on the subject of moral education —in the home, in the school, and in religious education. One group of readings in the book provides suggestions on how to implement the Values Clarification approach in a variety of specific school subject areas, including even such areas as mathematics and home economics. There is also a section of readings which review various contemporary perspectives, including those of Kohlberg and Rogers.